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1.1 Bankrupty laws and reditor rights prote-
tion
A rm's insolveny is an inevitable element of the market eonomy. A legal frame-
work for enforement of ontrats in the ase of a rm's insolveny is provided
by bankrupty laws.
1
Bankrupty laws not only protet the reditor's rights and
impose nanial disipline on managers, but also free assets from ineient use
and provide a resolution of debtor's laims, so that its resoure an be used for
new projets (Buttwill and Wihlborg, 2005).
However, the design of bankrupty regimes diers substantially aross oun-
tries in many respets. These dierenes reet path dependeny of legal and
eonomi systems as well as the fat that the framework for bankrupty has de-
veloped as the result of bargaining among various interests groups. We observe
that the divergene in the design of bankrupty laws is relatively signiant even
among ountries with relatively similar legal systems and ommon tradition, suh
1
Comparison of reent theories on personal and orporate bankrupty an be found in White
(2005). In our work we fous on the problem of orporate bankrupty.
5
as the U.S. and the U.K.
2
The bankrupty laws dier not only aross ountries but also over time. We ob-
serve onsiderable dereases in penalties for delaring bankrupty (Begrlof et al.,
2001). In Anient Rome the penalty for bankrupty was death or slavery. In
the Middle Ages the punishment was signiantly softened.
3
In the 18th entury,
rst bankrupty law was adopted in England, still ontaining imprisonment as
a ommon punishment. The rst bankrupty law allowing for a modern reor-
ganization proedure was not introdued until 1978, by Chapter 11 in U.S. law
(Djankov et al., 2003). In reent deades most of the industrial nations amended
their bankrupty laws, implementing various kinds of reorganization proedures.
4
The general trend towards moving from regimes with strit reditor protetion to
a more debtor-friendly approah is also reported in Westbrook (2001).
In general, we an distinguish bankrupty laws in the dimension of toughness
(stritness) of the law on the debtor, whih atually reets the dierent degrees of
reditor rights protetion. Bankrupty laws usually balane protetion of reditor
rights, whih is essential for the mobilization of apital for investment, while re-
straining premature liquidation of viable businesses (Claessen et al., 2001). Viable
enterprises an be kept in business by implementation of reorganization proedures
instead of liquidation; that, however, limits the reditor's rights.
1.1.1 Why do we need bankrupty laws?
The bankrupty law ertainly interferes with debtor's and reditor's rights. Why
do we need bankrupty laws that restrit the ontrat among debtor and reditor?
2
The dierenes between the Amerian and British bankrupty regimes are desribed in
detail in White (1996) or Buttwill and Wihlborg (2005). Claessen et al. (2001) mention that
the U.S. Bankrupty At of 1800 was a opy of the English law. Today, however, the U.S. law
with Chapter 11 is more debtor oriented ompared to reditor oriented British law.
3
Bankrupt debtors were usually publily humiliated, pilloried and put into prison. In England
they often had one ear ut (Djankov et al., 2003)
4
Italy 1979, Frane 1985, the United Kingdom 1986, New Zealand 1989, Australia and
Canada 1992, Germany 1994 and 1999, Sweden 1996, Japan and Mexio 2000, to name a few.
6
Why an the parties not write their own spei ontrat dealing with the problem
of a rm's insolveny? Standard justiation for bankrupty law is the argument
of multiple reditors. Usually we observe that a debtor has obligations to more
than one reditor. Without the state-guaranteed rule for insolveny, reditors
would be motivated to run on assets, as the rm's assets are usually not suient
to over all reditors' laims. This an lead to premature liquidation and soially
not optimal destrution of value. Bankrupty law thus solves the oordination
problem among reditors setting rules for all reditors.
The question that follows is why does a rm have multiple reditors. There
are several papers pointing to the multiple reditors setting arising endogenously
from the nanial ontrating. Berglöf et al. (2003), for example, develop a model
of an inomplete-ontrats framework with imperfet renegotiation. It shows that
having multiple reditors inreases a rm's debt apaity while dereasing the
debtor's inentives to default strategially. The need for bankrupty laws thus
arises endogenously as the inonsisteny of reditors' laims is a result of optimal
ontrat design.
5
1.1.2 Eient bankrupty proedures
No agreement exists on, how the optimal bankrupty regime should be designed.
However, Claessen et al. (2001) mention that ...badly written odes make every-
body worse o . Whether the optimal method of dealing with bankrupty is to
liquidate the rm, to sell it as a on-going onern or to start a reorganization
plan is losely onneted to asymmetri information about the ause of distress
(Buttwill and Wihlborg, 2005). The distintion between eonomi and nanial
distress is ruial. Eonomi distress means that the net value of the rm is neg-
ative and from an eonomi point of view the rm should be shut down. In the
ase of nanial distress the net present value of the rm is positive, but urrent
5
Similar onlusions are found by Bolton and Sharfstein (1996).
7
ash ows exeed the value of the rm's debts. The rm is insolvent as it annot
pay bak its obligations, but its value from the soial point of view is positive.
In the ase of nanial distress, restruturing or other forms of debt negotiation
are soially optimal, while in the ase of eonomi distress liquidation would be
optimal. If the rm is in nanial distress, the liquidation is regarded as ineient
from the soial point of view.
6
The role of an inappropriate bankrupty regime is often mentioned as a reason
of a deepness for the nanial rises. The East Asian nanial risis 1997-1998
have raised the question of how to deal with the resolution of nanial distress
and emphasized the debate on the optimal bankrupty regime. Aording to
many authors, an absene of the appropriate bankrupty regime in the East Asian
ountries onsiderably ompliated the proess of orporate restruturing after the
rises (Claessens et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2001), Stiglitz (2001), Fagan et al.
(2001)). They point out that even if the bankrupty proedures are not used for
restruturing, they determine the speed and extent of restruturing. Instead of
resolving their debts through bankrupty, most of the ompanies in East Asia
used out-of-ourt negotiations.
7
An appropriate extent of reorganization versus
liquidation in the bankrupty law has been heavily disussed in the ontext of the
U.S. Bankrupty At Chapter 11 (reorganization) and Chapter 7 (liquidation).
8
The topi of reorganization versus liquidation was very important in transition
ountries in the beginning of the transition period, when many ompanies beome
eonomially distressed due to the ineient prodution and nanially distressed
beause of the dramati hanges in the eonomy. In Chapter 2 of this thesis we
6
For example, Knot and Vyhodil (2004) points at the ase of many East Asian rms that
had their debts denominated in foreign urreny. These eonomially sound rms got in trouble
as the loal urreny depreiated. Liquidation of these rms would be soially not optimal.
7
Only 6 per ent of nanially distressed ompanies in Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, and Thai-
land resolved their debts through bankrupty, the rest used out-of-ourt renegotiation (Claessens
et al., 2001).
8
Among advoates of the Chapter 11 belong, for example, Giammarino and Nosal (1999),
Berglöf et al. (2003), Berkovith et al. (1998) and Brown (1989). The Chapter 11 has been
ritiized by e.g. Baird and Rasmussen (2003), Bebhuk (1988), Hart (2000) and Aghion et al.
(1992).
8
analyze the deision on the optimal bankrupty proedure in transition ountries
in ontext of privatization methods.
1.1.3 Creditor-friendly vs. debtor-friendly bankrupty laws
The debate whether the bankrupty regime should favor liquidation or reorgani-
zation is a part of the general disussion about debtor- versus reditor-friendly
bankrupty approahes. We talk about a reditor-friendly (tough) bankrupty
law if the proedure favors the reditor, giving him substantial rights in seizing
the assets of an insolvent rm. Suh a proedure prefers liquidation as this equals
taking possession of rm's assets. A bankrupty law supporting reorganization
proedure is onsidered to be debtor-friendly (soft), as this limits the reditor's
rights substantially and retains some ontrol rights by the debtor.
Considering the optimal bankrupty proedure, we annot fous only on the
ex-post view aording to whih we maximize the value of the insolvent rm for
all stakeholders (debtor, reditors, employees et.). We also have to take into
aount ex-ante eets, so that the proedure enourages managers to indue
eort in paying bak the debt, and reditors from giving imprudent redits. The
ex-ante eets are sometimes onsidered as even more important. As Stiglitz
(2001) mentioned, it is ruial to onsider the behavior inentives bankrupty
laws reate and not only whether the odes are fair or not.
If we onsider the ex-post eieny point of view, it is not soially optimal
to give all ontrol rights to the reditor. Biais and Mariotti (2003) show that the
reditor does not internalize all osts of its ations. He, for example, does not
take into aount the soial osts of liquidation and might deide to shut down an
insolvent rm, although it would be optimal to reorganize this rm and keep it in
business. Another reason, stressed by Berkovith and Israel (1999), is the infor-
mational advantage of the urrent rm's management. If the rm was hit by an
external shok, the management, having the best information about the ompany,
9
has the best hane of reorganizing the rm and ontinuing operation.
9
Moreover,
if the manager loses the ontrol in the insolvent rm due to the tough bankrupty
law, he might be motivated to arry out risky ations to avoid bankrupty (Hart,
2000).
On the other hand, keeping a lot of ontrol in the debtor's hands distorts
the debtor's ex-ante inentives and aggravates the problem of moral hazard of
nanial ontrating. If the debtor knows that he stays in ontrol even in the
ase of bankrupty, he is less motivated to avoid it. Soft bankrupty laws keeping
strong ontrol rights by the management an also be used by debtors to esape
the lenders. Moreover, aounting for the ex-ante eieny, we have to onsider
how the reditor adjusts his behavior before he gives the redit. If the reditor's
rights are signiantly limited and the reditor annot easily aess ollateralized
assets, his willingness to give redit is dereased, he inreases the prie of the
redit possibly leading to redit rationing.
10
The eet of redit rationing due
to a debtor-oriented bankrupty law is desribed by Biais and Mariotti (2003).
They study bankrupty in a general equilibrium framework, taking into aount
the interations between the redit and the labor markets. They nd that a soft
bankrupty law worsens redit rationing but still an maximize soial welfare.
Povel (1999) analyzes the tradeo between manager's eort levels and his
deision to delay bankrupty ling. He ompares two regimes of tough and soft
bankrupty laws and nds that when the law is soft managers do not ineiently
delay bankrupty ling, however they exert lower eort in performing the projet.
In the ase of the tough law, managers never le for bankrupty as they would
lose their jobs, but they have high inentives to exert eort.
9
Studying the ex-post eets of a bankrupty law, it is also very important to onsider the
osts of bankrupty. Several studies exist examining empirially diret and indiret osts of
bankrupty and nd them substantial (e.g. Warner (1977), Altman (1984), Bris et al. (2005)).
10
Cornelli and Felli (1997a) suggest a framework to analyze ex-ante and ex-post eieny
of bankrupty proedures. They show that the denition of reditors rights over the ompany
and the protetion of the reditors' seniority are ruial to assess the ex-ante eieny of a
bankrupty proedure.
10
The role of the ollateral and the bankrupty law that ats as a payment
inentives for the entrepreneur is studied by Bester (1994). His model investigates
how the prospet of debt renegotiation aets both the reditor's and the debtor's
behavior. In hapter 3 of this dissertation we extend the the model of Bester (1994)
and onsider the bankrupty law as an endogenous variable. We examine the
atual eet of the toughness of the bankrupty law on the number of liquidations.
One of the basi questions for the design of bankrupty law onerns whether
the value of an insolvent ompany should be divided in aordane with absolute
priority rule (APR). The APR implies that all reditors must be paid in full before
equity holders reeive anything and also determines the priorities among reditors
and requires that higher-priority reditors be repaid in full before lower-ranking
reditors reeive anything (White, 2005).
Bolton and Sharfstein (1996) and Bebhuk and Piker (1993) point out that
the violation of the absolute priority rule may enhane ex-ante eieny under
limited liability. Bebhuk (2002) analyzes what the negative eets on ex ante
deisions taken by shareholders are if we deviate from the absolute priority rule.
He nds that the deviation aggravates the moral hazard problem and inreases
the manager's inentive to favor risky projets. Weiss (1990) presents empirial
evidene of osts of APR violation on a sample of New York Stok Exhange rms
ling for bankrupty between 1979 and 1986.
Berkovith and Israel (1999) study how the dierenes aross eonomi systems
in the transpareny of information on fundamentals and the managers' ability to
use private information inuene the government's deision on the toughness of
the bankrupty law. They proposed a regime where only the reditor an le for
bankrupty for bank-oriented eonomies, while market-oriented eonomies should
inlude hapters allowing the debtor as well as the reditor to le for bankrupty.
11
1.1.4 Empirial observations
La Porta et al. (1997) and reently Djankov et al. (2005) argue in their empirial
studies that the hoie of the bankrupty design is determined by the origin of the
legal system, where ountries with the Frenh ivil-law legal system tend to have
softer bankrupty laws ompare to ommon-law ountries. Besides the inuene
of the legal system, the hoie of the optimal bankrupty proedure is also heavily
inuened by the politial proess. We observe that employment onsiderations
have led to favor restruturing (soft bankrupty law) over bankrupty in many
ountries (Buttwill and Wihlborg, 2005). After eonomi downturns, ountries
tend to avoid the osts of liquidation by implementing softer law. Berglöf et al.
(2003) mention another example from the 19th entury in the U.S., where the
softness of the bankrupty law was a reation to bankrupties of large railroad
ompanies. These bankrupties were onsidered to be against the publi interest
as they ould have slowed down onstrution of the railroad network between East
and West.
There is also a list of studies showing the eet of bankrupty laws on the
extent of redit naning and the importane for apital mobilization. Gangopad-
hyay and Wihlborg (2001) nd that naning inreases with proedures favoring
reditors. Similar results an be found in Rajan and Zingales (1995), La Porta
et al. (1997) and Djankov et al. (2005).
An important dimension of the bankrupty law is not only how the atual
law written in books protets the reditor's rights, but also how these rights are
enforeable. The enforement of law depends on the quality of the judiiary
system and overall rule of law in the ountry. Ayotte and Yun (2006) nd in
their theoretial model that the optimal reditor protetion heavily depends on
the existing legal environment. Pistor et al. (2000) and Pistor (2000) stress the
importane of law enforement for the protetion of reditor rights in the ontext
of transition ountries. They argue that the legal environment in the transition
12
ountries is a muh more important determinant of the redit market size than
the extent of reditor rights protetion written in laws.
This thesis ontributes to the existing literature in several ways. We analyze
dierent eets of bankrupty laws on the deision making of debtors and reditors
and onsider how these eets inuene the government's deision on the optimal
bankrupty design. In partiular, we ask in Chapter 2 how the hoie of the
optimal bankrupty law is aeted by privatization poliy in transition ountries.
In Chapter 3, we examine how the degree of reditor rights protetion inuenes
the number of liquidations if we take into aount the debtor's inentives to default
strategially. Finally, hapter 4 analyzes the inuene of bankrupty laws on the
lender's deision to share information. In more detail, we study how inentives are
hanged in dierent ompetition environments in the redit market. The following
setions give a brief introdution of all three hapters.
1.2 Bankrupty laws and privatization deisions
in transition ountries
After the breakdown of ommunism in Central and Eastern Europe, ountries in
this region faed a transition from a entral planned eonomy to a market eonomy.
The transition did not inlude only the hanges in the eonomial regime but
also ontained remarkable hanges in legal and institutional settings. One of the
most signiant hanges was privatization. In the ontrat theory point of view,
privatization an be regarded as a government's ommitment not to subsidize an
insolvent rm. Suh a ommitment leads to higher produtive eieny (Shmidt,
1996a) as the manager has inentives to avoid an insolvent situation. This proess
of hardening of the rm's budget onstraint via privatization, however, might lead
to liquidation, whih is ineient ex-post and thus to alloative ineieny.
Chapter 2 ontributes to the existing law and nane literature analyzing
13
the government hoie of the optimal bankrupty proedure in the ontext of
privatization deision. We argue that ountries that privatized their eonomy to
a large extent faed potentially high levels of liquidations. This threat motivated
governments in these ountries to implement poliies to mitigate the negative eet
of privatization. Bankrupty laws oer a diret tool ditating how the number
of liquidations an be limited. Adopting a soft bankrupty law disourages the
reditor from ling for bankrupty of an insolvent rm.
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The hapter presents an idea why the hoie of a soft bankrupty law might
be optimal from the point of view of the government that has to onsider the
privatization framework in the ountry. We argue that the transition to a market
eonomy (heavily inuened by the degree of privatization) reated a situation in
whih many rms beome nanially distressed. In suh a situation, implementing
a tough bankrupty law would result in a soially ineient high number of liq-
uidations. However, we have to onsider that the privatization was implemented
to harden the budget onstraint and hene to inrease the produtive eieny.
Adopting a soft bankrupty law softens the budget onstraint again. We take the
extent of privatization as given and onsider the hoie of the bankrupty law
balaning the trade-o between produtive and alloative eieny. We nd that
if the privatization level is high, the government prefers to limit the number of
liquidations diretly by implementing a soft bankrupty law. If the privatization
level is low, it pays o to motivate the managers with a tough bankrupty law
and to allow for a higher level of liquidation.
We also provide empirial evidene on the relationship between the toughness
of the bankrupty law and the extent of privatization in transition ountries.
Empirial evidene supports our theoretial predition that ountries with a large
degree of privatization inline to implement softer bankrupty laws.
11
We an also observe other ways how the government might try to mitigate the negative ef-
fets of privatization. For example, in the beginning of the transition period the Czeh Republi
privatized state-owned enterprizes to a large extent but was relutant to privatize state-owned
banks. These politially ontrolled banks were giving imprudent redits to many already priva-
tized rms.
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1.3 Bankrupty laws and debt renegotiation
The regime of bankrupty law inuenes on the number of bankrupties in the
ountry. The atual impat is, however, not obvious. Claessens and Klapper
(2005) nd in their empirial analysis that the eet of the toughness of the bank-
rupty law is heavily inuened by the quality of law enforement and judiial
eieny in a ountry. In ountries with a bad judiial system, tougher bank-
rupty law, giving better reditor rights protetion, leads to a higher number of
liquidations. However, in ountries with good law enforement, tougher bank-
rupty law leads to a lower number of liquidations.
In Chapter 3 we present a simple model of borrowing and lending with asym-
metri information, where due to the possibility of renegotiation the reditor an-
not redibly ommit to liquidating the debtor if the default ours. The model
aptures the prinipal-agent problem between the reditor and the debtor, where
both parties have symmetri information about the ex-ante protability of the
projet, but the absene of state veriation reates the informational asymmetry
at the time the projet is realized. We analyze the eet of the bankrupty law on
the number of liquidations. Moreover, we onsider dierent degrees of ompetition
in the redit market and examine how the ompetitive environment inuenes the
number of liquidated rms.
The model extents the model of Bester (1994) with a new modeling of the
renegotiation stage aording to the soft budget onstraint literature. We treat
the bankrupty law as a one-dimensional variable that inuenes reditor's ex-
peted value of assets that an be reovered. We nd that an interval of the law
exists, where the toughness is negatively orrelated with the number of liquida-
tions. Tough bankrupty law inreases the payo from liquidation for the reditor.
However, if the bankrupty law is not tough enough to enourage the reditor to
always initiate the liquidation, the entrepreneur might try to avoid paying bak
the redit by laiming default even if the rm is not insolvent. Inreasing the
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toughness of the law in this ase disourages the entrepreneur from suh behavior
and dereases the number of defaults. We also nd that the number of liquidations
is higher in less ompetitive environments as the prie of the redit is higher in
this ase and the entrepreneur has more inentives to avoid paying it bak. From
the soial point of view, softer bankrupty law is more likely to be implemented
in more ompetitive environments, as the liquidation rate in more ompetitive
markets is lower.
The model presents an idea why a tough bankrupty law might lead to a
lower number of liquidations. Suh a relationship is observed by Claessens and
Klapper (2005) in ountries with good judiial eieny. Furthermore, we extend
the analysis by examining the eet of bank ompetition. Our empirial results
support the ndings of the model that less ompetitive redit markets experiene
higher liquidation rates.
1.4 How does the bankrupty law inuene a lender's
deision on information sharing?
Credit markets are aeted by asymmetri information between lenders and bor-
rowers. There are two basi views how lenders an redue the problem of asym-
metri information. Aording to the rst reditor power view, power given to
the reditor by bankrupty laws matters and an redue the moral hazard prob-
lem. If the reditor an more easily enfore repayment, ask for the ollateral
or threaten with liquidation he is more willing to provide redit. Aording to
the seond informational view, lenders an fous on the type of asymmetri in-
formation that gives rise to the problem of adverse seletion. The reditor an
solve the problem of information asymmetry by investing in sreening, monitor-
ing, or obtain information about the debtors from other reditors. Djankov et al.
(2005) and Jappelli and Pagano (2002) provide some empirial evidene that the
16
informational and reditor power approahes might be substitutes.
In hapter 4, we fous on the determinants of institutions to share information
studying the banks' deisions to establish a private institution for information
sharing in a two-period model with moral hazard and adverse seletion problem.
We analyze how the banks' deisions are inuened by the degree of bank om-
petition in the redit market. The possibility that bankrupty laws providing the
reditor rights protetion might be substitutes to information sharing is taken
into aount. We study the government's deision on the optimal level of bank-
rupty law in dierent ompetition environment and how this deision inuenes
the banks' deision to share information.
We nd that there exists a parameter spae, where a higher degree of om-
petition in the banking market is assoiated with a higher degree of information
sharing. In this interval, the government has inentives to implement a tough
bankrupty law to redue the moral hazard problem in a monopoly banking en-
vironment in the rst period. The side-eet of the bankrupty law solves the
adverse seletion problem in the seond period as bankrupty law works as a
substitute to information sharing. In a more ompetitive environment, the gov-
ernment does not have suh inentives to implement tough bankrupty law. In the
seond period, banks have to solve the adverse seletion problem by information
sharing.
The literature on information sharing predits an opposite relationship (Jap-
pelli and Pagano, 1993), i.e. banks in less ompetitive market are more likely
to share information. We present empirial evidene on the extend of private
information sharing in 104 ountries around the world. Using the instrumental
variable approah that solves the problem of endogeneity we nd that ountries
with more ompetitive banking environment have larger share of population ov-
ered by private information sharing institution.
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Chapter 2
Bankrupty Laws and Privatization
Deision in Transition Countries
2.1 Introdution
Bankrupty law design diers substantially aross ountries. On the one hand,
UK and Germany are typial examples of ountries, where the main objetive of
bankrupty law is the protetion of reditors. Suh a system is seen as tough on
debtors. On the other hand, ountries like Frane or the U.S. have bankrupty
systems that are soft on debtors (or debtor oriented), limiting reditor's rights,
emphasizing the rm's reorganization and taking into aount soial interest. The
tough bankrupty law supports the rights of reditors and makes it easier for them
to seize assets of the insolvent rm. As seizing of the assets leads to liquidation of
the rm, tougher bankrupty law might lead to a higher number of liquidations.
The debtor oriented legislative is supported by a view that reditor's behavior
an lead to extensive liquidations, hene it may not be soially optimal. The soft
bankrupty law makes the liquidation less attrative for the reditor and allows
for reorganization that keeps the ompany in business.
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The optimal bankrupty proedure has been onsidered an important ompo-
nent of transition from entrally planned eonomy (Aghion et al., 1992). Tran-
sition ountries in Eastern Europe had to set their ompany law system from
srath. Although they all faed similar starting positions and a similar level of
entral planning, they have hosen signiantly dierent levels of bankrupty law.
Some ountries, e.g. the Czeh Republi, adopted a soft bankrupty law, while
other ountries like Hungary or Slovenia adopted relatively tough bankrupty laws
(EBRD, 2004).
The ontribution of this hapter is an examination of a relationship between
the privatization deision and the bankrupty law. We argue that the deision
about the level of bankrupty law in transition eonomies was inuened by the
dierent level of privatization in these ountries. Privatization was one of the
main tasks for the governments in the transition from the entral planned eon-
omy to the market based eonomy, however ountries dier in the extent of re-
forms. Some governments privatized many ompanies in a short period of time
and others opted for a gradual proess, giving the government more ontrol over
the transition. The bankrupty law is an important fator inuening the redit
market and respetively the entire eonomy. Tough bankrupty law, giving more
rights to the reditor, dereases the prie of a redit and improves the inentives
of managers. However, it might lead to a high number of liquidations and thus
high unemployment osts (Berkovith and Israel, 1999). The high level of liquida-
tion might not be soially optimal, espeially in times when the eonomy is very
fragile. We argue that if the government has deided for privatization of a large
number of rms, it might be afraid of a high level of liquidation of many privatized
ompanies, and this gives politiians an inentive to soften the bankrupty law.
On the ontrary, in ountries that opted for a gradual way of privatization and
privatized a limited number of rms, the share of publi ompanies is large. As
the government an help these ompanies if they get in eonomi troubles, they
are not threatened by liquidation. The publi rms are then never insolvent and
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therefore they are not threatened by the bankrupty law. When the number of
private rms is smaller, the osts of liquidation are smaller and the government
hooses a tougher bankrupty law improving the inentives of managers in private
ompanies.
2.1.1 Bankrupty laws
As we mentioned in the introdution, it is important to distinguish between ex-
ante and ex-post eets of bankrupty law. A soft law allows for restruturing
a ompany, taking into aount soial osts of liquidation of a bankrupt rm.
Softness of the law an be seen, for example, in a disretion spae that is given
to a judge deiding about the liquidation of the ompany. The softer the law, the
more disretion the judge an use and the more rms will be reorganized and kept
in business and not shut down.
Giving reditors full ontrol does not ensure that the soially optimal solution
will be implemented. Creditors might not internalize all the eets of their de-
isions. The most ommon example are the soial osts of unemployment. On
the one hand, it might be optimal for reditors to liquidate the bankrupt om-
pany ausing unemployment osts, while on the other hand, it would be soially
optimal to keep the old management in power to reorganize the ompany and
limit the unemployment osts. Espeially in the ase of transition eonomies the
unemployment osts might be exessive and atually anelling a part of the debt
and keeping the management in power might be soially optimal. Thus, the soft
law an implement the ex-post soially optimal solution.
The ex-ante eieny point of view fouses on the inuene of the bankrupty
law on the behavior of reditors and debtors before the redit is provided. If the
bankrupty law is soft, giving the reditors less rights, the reditors will rise the
ost of redit to ensure the same expeted payo. This might result in redit
rationing. Moreover, weak bankrupty law inuenes the eort exerted by the
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manager in a negative way. If the manager knows that the ompany will not
be liquidated but rather reorganized and he keeps the job, he might exert less
managerial eort and therefore worsen the eonomi outome of the rm.
Why do some ountries prefer a tough and some a soft bankrupty law? One of
the possible explanations is presented in La Porta et al. (1997). The authors nd
that the level of reditor's protetion depends on the legal origin in the ountries.
Countries with legal system roots in German and ommon law legal system present
a relatively better protetion of reditors than a Frenh ivil law.
However, we an argue that the legal systems in transition ountries are similar
and we fous in our model on a more politial explanation of the emergene of legal
dierenes in the bankrupty law. Biais and Raasens (2000) in their model show
that if the soiety is more onerned about the soial osts, it prefers the soft law
over the tough one. The tough law is preferred when the redit rationing is more
important and soial osts are limited. Authors have built a general equilibrium
model with the labor and redit market, explaining dierent bankrupty law levels
by the dierent distribution of wealth in the soiety. Countries where the pivotal
voters are middle lass itizens prefer tough law, as these itizens an benet from
enhaned entrepreneurial opportunities. In the soieties where the majority of the
voters are rather poor, so that they are redit rationed even under the tough law,
soft law is preferred.
Biais and Mariotti (2003) have built a model based on Holmstrom and Ti-
role (1997) orporate nane model. The results are quite similar to Biais and
Raasens (2000), however, the major ontribution of this paper is inorporating
orrupt judges. A paper of Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. (2000) studying the proess
in Russia also onsiders the eet of orrupt judges. Both studies ome to the
same onlusions. In a ountry where the judges are orrupted, tough bankrupty
law should be adopted. The orrupt judges use their disretionary power rather
to obtain bribes than to internalize soial osts of liquidation and maximize soial
welfare, and this leads only to more redit rationing.
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2.1.2 Privatization
In our analysis, we study the deision about the optimal bankrupty law in the
ontext of privatization in transition ountries. The problem of privatization has
been muh studied in the eonomi literature. The famous Williamson puzzle
(Williamson, 1985) asks why the privatized rm should perform better than the
private one as the government an always hire a manager under the same ontrat
as the private owner. Sappington and Stiglitz (1988) argue that a privatized rm
should always be at least as eient as a publi ompany. They suggest an aution,
where the government sells the ompany and the owner of the privatized rm
obtains the exat soial value of the rm. The government an ahieve eient
alloation even though it does not know the ost funtion. The new owner hooses
the optimum prodution level and also internalizes the soial value of the rm in
its valuation.
Due to these arguments; it is not obvious why governments opt for privati-
zation. One of the onepts that answers this problem omes from an inom-
plete ontrat approah (Shmidt (1996a), Laont and Tirole (1991), Shmidt
and Shnitzer (1993), Shmidt (1996b)). The inomplete ontrat approah em-
phasizes that it is not possible to write a omplete ontingent ontrat. The
inomplete ontrat then reates osts due to the asymmetri information be-
tween the government and the private owner or manager. Shmidt (1996a) argues
that by implementing privatization, the government ommits itself to harden the
budget onstraint of a manager (rm) and this fores the manager to improve the
produtive eieny. In ase of nationalization (the opposite of privatization), the
government annot ommit not to distort the prodution level in a publi rm and
this results in a soft-budget onstraint for the manager in a publi rm. Due to the
soft-budget onstraint, inentives of the manager to exert eort (to investment in
ost redution) are distorted.
1
However, implementing privatization brings some
1
The problem of hardening the budget onstraint in transition ountries is disussed in detail
by Kornai (2001).
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osts. The manager of a privatized ompany does not internalize all the osts and
hooses the prodution level that is not soially optimal. Börner (2004) studies
how the government's deision about privatization is inuened by the govern-
ment onerns about unemployment. The government in our model an use the
bankrupty law to soften the hard budget onstraint imposed by privatization. It
annot ommit not to distort the prodution level. Following the bankrupty law,
only some ompanies will not be liquidated, beause the liquidation deision is to
be done by independent ourts.
Another strand of literature fouses on the ageny problem of politiians rather
than the ageny problem of managers. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Boyko
et al. (1996) argue that it may be politially less ostly to inuene the employment
level in a publi ompany than to subsidize a private rm. The publi (voters) may
not be aware of the potential prots that the publi rm is wasting on an ineient
employment level but they realized when the government would like to subsidize
a private rm from tax revenues. There privatization solves the politiians ageny
problem and enhanes eieny.
2.2 Model
We understand bankrupty law as a law that desribes rules to liquidate a om-
pany if this ompany is insolvent. Bankrupty law an be tough or soft. Under
the tough bankrupty law, all ompanies that are insolvent will be liquidated and
the reditor will get the liquidation value. Under soft insolveny law, however,
not all insolvent ompanies will be liquidated. Soft law is understood as a law
that protets the debtor more than the reditor. In our model, we will denote the
toughness (or stritness) of the law by a one-dimensional variable α, α ∈ (0, 1),
α = 0 means a soft law (rms not liquidated even when they are in loss), α = 1
indiates a tough law. The variable α then denotes the atual liquidation rate of




The idea of our model is the following. The government hooses the toughness
of the bankrupty law. Then, there is a ontinuum of rms on the interval [0, 1],
with share of y private ompanies and (1− y) publi ompanies. We onsider the
privatization deision, i.e. the value of y, as exogenously given. In the private
rm, there is a risk-neutral entrepreneur maximizing his prot; in the state-owned
ompany, the government hires a manager.
The basi model of the redit market is inspired by Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997). We extend the analysis by modelling the bankrupty law and introduing
the problem of privatization by adding the publi rms to the model. All ompa-
nies have an investment opportunity. All the projets are idential. The projet
yields a return R or 0, investment osts are c. The entrepreneur and the manager
in the publi rm respetively, exert eort and inuene the probability of suess
of the projet, suering the disutility e. If the entrepreneur (or manager) exerts
eort, then the projet will yield R with a probability ph or bring 0 with a proba-
bility (1− ph). If the entrepreneur does not exert eort, the projet yields R with
probability pl and fails with probability 1− pl, where pl < ph. The entrepreneur's
(manager's) eort e an be understood also as an investment in ost redution.
The ruial assumption is that the eort e is not observable and annot be on-
trated upon, whih results in a moral hazard problem between the bank and the
entrepreneur. To undertake the projet, the rm needs to raise outside funds to
over the whole investment osts c. The interest rate, for simpliity, is set to 0.
The rm gets a redit of an amount c from the bank. We assume a perfetly
ompetitive redit market.
2
The toughness of bankrupty law an be understood as a disretion given to a judge. If a
judge has a lot of disretion in his deision, he an deide not to liquidate a ompany, even if
it is insolvent, for example taking into aount high soial osts of liquidation. Bankrupty law
giving a lot of disretion to a judge is then onsidered to be soft. The liquidation rate under soft
bankrupty law is lower also beause soft bankrupty law inreases the osts of the liquidation
proedure for reditors. If, for example, the bankrupty proedure an start only with more than
one reditor, this imposes additional osts on the reditor to searh other reditors. If searhing
osts are high enough, it does not pay o the reditor to start the liquidation proedure.
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In the rst period, the government takes a deision about the toughness of
the bankrupty law maximizing the soial welfare. The soial welfare onsists
of the welfare of the entrepreneurs, managers, banks and soial osts aused by
rms, that have been shut down. We assume that, if the rm is liquidated, this
leads to soial osts orresponding to the destrution of spei human apital,
rm spei investments and also the unemployment osts of the laid-o workers.
Espeially the unemployment osts might be substantial (Tirole, 2001).
In the seond period, the entrepreneur exerts eort. In the third period,
returns are realized and the rm has to pay bak the prie of the redit T to
the bank. At the end of the game, it an pay bak T only if the projet is
suessful. If the projet is not suessful, the rm does not have any money and
it annot pay bak the redit. Then, the reditor (bank) an start a liquidation
proedure. If the rm is liquidated, the bank gets the liquidation value L. The
liquidation value is assumed to be smaller than the ost of the projet c.
Whenever the ompany is not liquidated, managers obtain a non-transferable
benet B. This B might represent the satisfation of an entrepreneur or a man-
ager, benets of a manager from being a CEO in the ompany, or any other kind
of benets the manager (or entrepreneur) earns from staying in power.
In the private rm the entrepreneur gets with probability pi, i = h, l, return
R and private benet B and has to pay bak the redit prie T . With probability
1 − pi, i = h, l, the projet does not bring any revenue, but the ompany is
liquidated only with probability α. Thus, the entrepreneur gets this private benet
B not only when the projet is suessful, but also in the ase when the projet
is not suessful but the rm is not liquidated. This happens with probability
α(1− pi); i = h, l (2.1)
In the ase of the publi rm, we assume that the government never liquidates
a publi rm, i.e. the osts of liquidation (unemployment osts) are larger than
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the osts of ineient prodution plR − c > U . This ruial assumption is based
on the idea that the unemployment osts aused by losing down a rm are muh
higher than simply repaying the debt of the ompany. If the ompany suers
a loss, then the government annot ommit not to help this rm and prefers to
subsidize the ompany rather than letting the rm go bankrupt.
The government subsidy to a private rm is onsidered to be more ostly
for the government than the subsidy to a publi rm (Boyko et al., 1996). In
our model we do not allow the government to subsidize the private ompany. The
government ommits not to interfere with the private rm's employment deisions
(Börner, 2004). In the ase of the private ompany, the entrepreneur does not
internalize the unemployment osts aused by the liquidation of the ompany.
These are the osts of privatization, beause the government annot subsidize the
private rm. The government an nevertheless still subsidize the publily owned
ompany. Justiation for this assumption an be found in the argument that the
osts of subsidizing private ompanies are muh higher than subsidizing a publi
ompany. It might also be diult for politiians explaining to the voters why
they help owners of the private ompany.
If we onsider a publi ompany, there is no entrepreneur anymore. The gov-
ernment hires a manager instead. The manager obtains wage w in both states
of the world. And he gets the private benet from being manager B when the
rm is not liquidated. A type of ontrat, where the manager gets a xed wage
in both states of the world, is learly a simpliation and the government ould
introdue a wage sheme, where the payment depends on whih state of the world
is realized. Nevertheless, the manager's inentives to exert eort will always be
smaller than the inentives of the entrepreneur in the private ompany, beause
in the publi ompany the government annot ommit (in our setting) not to help
the rm in the bad state of the rm. Thus, we believe this simpliation does not
hange our qualitative results and just makes the dierene between the publi
and the private rm more obvious.
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The government also annot threaten the manager to re him, beause it is
assumed that all managers are idential. The newly hired manager would have
the same inentive as the previous one. If there are just minimal searhing osts
for a new manager, it is never optimal to hange the manager (Shmidt, 1996b).
The game is solved by bakward indution. First, we determine the optimal
eort ondition for a publi and private rm that depends on the level of the
toughness of the bankrupty law. Then, we onsider the government's deision
about the optimal level of the toughness of the bankrupty law α, depending on
the number of publi and private rms in the eonomy.












We analyze two senarios with dierent speiation of unemployment osts.
In the rst senario, we assume the unemployment osts produed by liquidation of
a single rm are inreasing in the privatization level. The seond senario assumes
unemployment osts independent on the privatization level but onsiders new and
old rms in the eonomy. The reasoning for these two senarios is the following.
If we onsider unemployment osts independent on the privatization level, the
privatization level does not inuene the government's deision to adopt a soft
or tough bankrupty law. An inrease in the number of private rms inreases
the produtive eieny and the liquidation osts in the same proportion. If we
onsider unemployment osts inreasing in the level of privatization, this is going
to hange. Also, if we take into aount existene of old and new private rms
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in the eonomy, the privatization level inuenes the government's hoie of the
optimal bankrupty law.
2.3 Senario 1: Unemployment osts depending
on the privatization level
The unemployment osts might be onsidered not only as diret osts of unem-
ployment benets, that the government has to pay to dismissed workers, but also
as soial osts that are produed by the shut-down of the rm. If a small rm is
liquidated, it does not inuene the life in a town as muh as when a big plant
in a small town is liquidated. If a big plant is liquidated, it does not mean only
thousands of workers laid-o, but also might lead to a radial hange of life in a
small town. People have to move to nd a job and this produes additional osts
of unemployment. Suh a situation, we observe in some regions, with a strong
mining industry, where unemployment reahed a ertain level and loked these
regions in an unemployment trap. The other reason an be found in the trade
arrears.
3
Beause of trade arrears, the bankrupty of one rm might inuene liq-
uidation of another rm. Hene the unemployment aused by liquidation of one
rm might through the trade arrears inuene further inrease of unemployment
due to the liquidation of other rms. Some reent studies show that orporate
bankrupties are orrelated (Das et al., 2006).
The higher the portion of bankrupt ompanies, the faster the unemployment
osts grow. This assumption seems to be reasonable in transition ountries, whih
faed system hange and the unemployment osts were not just the unemployment
benets, but the threat of ollapse of the entire new system. Unemployment osts
our only if the ompany is liquidated. The unemployment osts depend on the
3
Trade arrears arise when a ompany beome insolvent and annot pay their suppliers. Trade
arrears were ommon in transition ountries at the beginning of transition. (Berglöf and Roland,
1998).
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number of unemployed N . The higher is the number of unemployed, the higher are
the unemployment osts. As the number of unemployed atually depends on the
number of liquidated private rms (publi rms are not liquidated and therefore
do not produe any unemployment), we an write the unemployment osts as a
funtion of number of unemployed and this as a funtion of y: U [N(y)] = U [y], the
total unemployment osts are y(1 − p)aU [y]) and the funtion of unemployment
osts is inreasing in y, i.e. U ′[y] > 0.
2.3.1 Optimal eort - private rm
We start our analysis determining the optimal eort ondition for the private rm.
High eort ase
The payo of the entrepreneur (owner of the private rm) if he exerts eort is:
Πe,h = ph(R +B − T ) + (1− ph)(1− α)B − e (2.2)
If he does not exert eort, his payo is:
Πe,l = pl(R +B − T ) + (1− pl)(1− α)B (2.3)
Obviously, the entrepreneur hooses the high eort, if his payo is higher than
in the other ase, i.e. his inentive ompatibility onstraint is:
ph(R+B − T ) + (1− ph)(1−α)B − e ≥ pl(R+B − T ) + (1− pl)(1−α)B (2.4)
The hoie of the entrepreneur depends on the prie of the redit T . We an
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rearrange the inentive ompatibility onstraint.




If the prie of the redit is too high, it does not pay o for the entrepreneur
to exert eort. The partiipation of the bank granting the redit is then:





It is lear that for the bank, the prie has to be large enough, to generate at
least zero prot. Thus, the prie of the redit has to be high enough to fulll
the inentive onstraint of the manager and has to be low enough to fulll the
partiipation onstraint of the reditor. Both onstraints hold if the inequality
(2.7) is satised.







Expression (2.7) is inreasing in α, i.e. the higher is α the higher is the
probability that the rm gets the redit and will hoose to exert eort. We an
nd the minimal αH , suh that for all α ≥ αH , the expression (2.7) being positive.
α ≥ αH =
c(ph − pl) + ph(e−R(ph − pl))
(ph − pl)(phB + (1− ph)L)
(2.8)
However, if the α is too small suh that the expression (2.8) is negative (α <
αH), then the heapest redit the bank an oer is too expensive for the rm
taking into aount its inentive onstraint. We have shown that for α > αH the
high eort is implemented, for α < αH , no eort is exerted. This leads to the
following lemma.
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Lemma 2.1. The eort hosen by the manager is non-dereasing in the toughness
of the bankrupty law α.
Lemma 2.2. The minimum level of the bankrupty law αH that implements the
high eort is lower
• the higher is the probability of suess ph
• the higher is the private benet B
• the higher is the liquidation value L
• the lower is the ost of the projet c
• the higher is the return of the projet R.
Proof. See Appendix
As ph > pl, the higher is the return of the projet, the easier it is to enourage
high eort. The same holds for the privative benets, beause in the ase when the
projet was unsuessful, the entrepreneur gets only (1− a)B and this is smaller
or equal to B what he gets in the ase of suess of the projet. If L is larger or c
smaller, the bank will be satised with a lower prie of the redit T and this gives
additional inentives to the entrepreneur to try harder.
No eort ase
In the ase, where α is too small to implement high eort, low eort is still





The partiipation onstraint of the entrepreneur is then
pl(R +B − T ) + (1− pl)(1− α)B ≥ 0 (2.10)
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If both partiipation onstraints are fullled and insolveny law α is smaller than
αH , no eort is exerted and the redit is granted. If both partiipation onstraints
(2.9) and (2.10) annot be fullled, no redit is granted and no projet is realized.
2.3.2 Optimal eort - publi rm
In the ase of the publi rm, the government hires a manager. A hired manager
knows, that this rm will never be liquidated. He knows, he always gets the xed
wage w and the private benet B. Manager's payo is then:
Πm = piB + (1− pi)B + w − e , i=h,l (2.11)
= B + w − e (2.12)
It is lear that the manager will hoose the smallest eort e = 0. As we assume
ompetitive markets for idential managers, the wage w oered to a manager is
suh that the expeted utility equals the manager's reservation utility U . We
assume that the publi rm is never liquidated, therefore it always gets a redit.
2.3.3 Optimal bankrupty law
The government takes the deision about the toughness of the bankrupty law
maximizing the soial welfare. The soial welfare onsists of the welfare of en-
trepreneurs, managers, banks and soial osts aused by rms, that will be shut
down. The government's objetive funtion for high and low eort is :
Gi(α) = y[piR− (1− pi)α(U [y]− L)] + (1− y)plR− c, i = h, l (2.13)
The portion of y private ompanies yields R with probability pi. Publi ompanies
get R with probability pl. The private benet of the manager B is not inluded
in the soial welfare and the payment of T anels out. In the ase of liquidation
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the unemployment osts U [y] arise and the reditor obtains the liquidation value
L. The aim of our analysis is to determine the optimal hoie of the bankrupty
law α, given the level of privatization y.
Proposition 2.1. The optimal level of the toughness of the bankrupty law α is
non-inreasing in the privatization level y.
Proof. See Appendix
The optimal bankrupty law is non-inreasing in the level of privatization.
Thus, ountries with higher level of privatization are more likely to opt for a
softer bankrupty law. The private ompany an potentially go bankrupt. The
probability that the private rm is liquidated depends on the toughness of the
bankrupty law α and on the probability of suess of the projet ph (pl), whih,
among others, is also inuened by the toughness of bankrupty law via the eet
on the entrepreneur's eort. If privatization is not extensive, tough law positively
eets high eort and, due to the low number of private rms, the potential osts
aused by ineient liquidation under tough law are limited. Therefore, the gov-
ernment prefers tough law when the privatization level is low. As privatization
inreases, the potential osts of liquidation beome high under a tough law and
are not outweighed by an inrease in protability of private rms via higher en-
trepreneur's eort. The example of the government's payo funtion is illustrated
in Figure 2.2. The gure depits the government's payo for α = 0 and the gov-
ernment's payos in the point of the tough bankrupty law (α = αH) for three
dierent unemployment ost levels; low, medium and high. If the unemployment
osts are relatively low then the government prefers the tough bankrupty law
(α = αH) to the soft law (α = 0) for all levels of privatization. If the unemploy-
ment osts are relatively high, then the government prefers the soft bankrupty
law to tough soft law for all levels of privatization. In the last ase of medium un-
employment osts the government prefers the tough bankrupty law for low levels
of privatization and prefers soft bankrupty law for high levels of privatization.
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Figure 2.2: The government's payo; R = 5; ph = 2/3; pl = 1/3;B = 4;L =
3.5; c = 4; e = 1; high: U [y] = 20 · y + 11; low: U [y] = 9 · y; medium U [y] = 20 · y
In all publi ompanies, managers know that the government will always grant
a subsidy in the bad state of the world and therefore they are not investing in ost
redution (not exerting eort). Entrepreneurs in private rms know that there is
no subsidy from the government in the bad state of the world and this enourages
them to try hard. Nevertheless, private ompanies might be unsuessful (with a
smaller probability than the publi ones), they will be liquidated and this would
ause the unemployment osts. The impat of liquidation an be mitigated by a
softer bankrupty law. Soft bankrupty law in this ontext means that not all
insolvent ompanies will be liquidated.
On the one hand, government in a ountry with a large share of private prop-
erty has an inentive to derease the stritness of bankrupty law, beause a large
share of privately owned rms may lead to exessively high osts of unemployment.
On the other hand, a ountry with a high portion of state owned (ontrolled) prop-
erty an aord tough bankrupty laws, beause the osts of unemployment are
limited and might be outweighed by the eieny benets, as the tougher law
reates more inentives to exert eort by the entrepreneur.
Proposition 2.2. The tough bankrupty law is more likely to be implemented the
lower are the unemployment osts U .
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Proof. See Appendix
If unemployment osts U are small, the government does not have to protet
the rms so muh by a soft bankrupty law as the liquidation osts are lower and
it an implement a tougher bankrupty proedure.
The result of our analysis depends on the ruial assumption about unit un-
employment osts related to the the levels of unemployment. If we onsider the
unemployment osts unrelated to the privatization level, then the government's
payo in the point α = 0 is either larger or smaller than the payo in the point
α = αH for all y. In other words, either only tough bankrupty law or only soft
bankrupty law is preferred for all levels of privatization, and this ase does not
bring any interesting insight.
In the publily held ompanies, the manager knows that if it is not soially
optimal, the government will never liquidate a publi rm and will rather subsi-
dize the unsuessful rm. We onsider the ase, when a liquidation of a publily
owned ompany is never soially optimal and subsidies are allowed only for pub-
lily owned rms. We assume that the subsidy to the private rm is assoiated
with additional prohibitive osts and is not possible. The bankrupty law, then,
does not inuene manager's eort in a state owned enterprize (SOE). Private
rms are more eient in the prodution, beause the owners are exerting more
eort than the managers in SOE. Private rms, though, in ontrast to publi
rms, might go bankrupt. If a transition ountry has deided to privatize a
large share of its eonomy, then there are potential high osts of unemployment.
Therefore, suh a ountry might prefer the soft law, diminishing the eet of an
ineient liquidation. If the number of privatized rms is relatively small, then
the osts of unemployment are limited and the ountry might prefer the tough
bankrupty law enouraging high eorts exerted by the entrepreneurs in private
rms. Governments have in bankrupty law another tool to orret for extreme
osts of ineient liquidation by private rms, i.e. to derease the osts produed
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by privatization.
2.4 Senario 2: Old versus new rms in transition
ountries
In this setion, we onsider the seond senario of our model. The speiation
of the model remains the same as in the previous setion, exept the assumption
of unemployment osts linearly inreasing in the privatization level and introdu-
tion of old and new rms in the eonomy. We assume that the unemployment
osts are linear in the level of privatization, i.e. unit unemployment osts are
onstant for all y and total unemployment osts inrease linearly with number
of unemployed workers. We also introdue a distintion between old state rms
and newly established enterprizes in transition eonomies. The share of old rms
in the eonomy is x, the share of new rms is 1 − x. The old rms are at the
beginning in all transition ountries publily owned and the privatization deision
is made about these rms. There are also new rms in the eonomy. These rms
are all privately owned. The new rms have the same harateristis as the old
ones, the only dierene is that the probability of suess in these rms when
the entrepreneur exerts high eort qh is higher than probability of suess in old
rms (ph). The probability of suess if no eort is exerted is the same for old
and new rms (ql = pl). The motivation behind this assumption is the fat that
the publily owned ompanies had usually very ineient prodution proesses,
a soialisti struture of orporate governane, the prodution was determined
by a entral plan and therefore managers had less possibilities to inuene the
outome with their eort. These rms also had large number of employees and
were therefore very diult to reorganize. After the privatization deision on old
rms is done, the government sets the bankrupty law. Then, the game proeeds
as in the previous setion; rms ask for a redit in a bank, hoose their eort level
and in the last period, payos are realized.
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The optimization problem of the entrepreneurs in the new rms is the same
as in the old rms. However, the probability of suess is larger and therefore
the level of bankrupty law that implements high eort is smaller for new rms.
As these rms are more protable, they are ready to aept a higher prie of the
redit due to the softer bankrupty law and still hoose the high eort. The prot
of a new rm ΠN in ase of high and low eort an be written as:
ΠNH = qh(R +B − T ) + (1− qh)B(1− α)− e (2.14)
ΠNL = ql(R +B − T ) + (1− ql)B(1− α) (2.15)




Again, to implement high eort, the inentive onstraint and the bank's partii-
pation onstraint have to be fullled together. The onstraints are fullled if:
α ≥ αN =
c(qh − pl) + qh[e−R(qh − ql)]
(qh − ql)(qhB + (1− qh)L)
(2.16)
We have shown in Lemma 2.2 that minimal αH is dereasing in ph and therefore,
αN is learly smaller than the minimal bankrupty law level by old rms, αH .
The government's payo depends on the level of the bankrupty law. First,
the bankrupty law diretly inuenes the liquidation rate of rms that are unsu-
essful. Seond, it inuenes the inentives of managers and the eort they exert.
It is lear that we have to onsider only three levels of the bankrupty law, i.e.
α = 0, α = αN and α = αH . Any level in between is learly not optimal, beause
it does not eet inentives and only inreases the osts due to the larger liqui-
dation rate. If we assume that high eort is not optimal for α = 0, i.e. αN > 0,
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then the payo of the government is:
Gα=0 = x[yplR + (1− y)plR] + (1− x)qlR (2.17)
Gα=αN = x[y(plR + (1− pl)[−αN(U − L)] + (1− y)plR)]
+ (1− x)[qhR + (1− qh)[−αN(U − L)]] (2.18)
Gα=αH = x[y(phR + (1− ph)[−αH(U − L)] + (1− y)plR)]
+ (1− x)[qhR + (1− qh)[−αH(U − L)]] (2.19)
The payo in the point α = 0 is onstant for all levels of privatization. The
government's payo in ases when α = αN and α = αH is dereasing in y.
So far, we have just assumed that the probability of suess is larger in the
new rms than in the old rms. Now, we make an additional assumption about
the amount of this dierene. We assume that the new rms are so protable
that the tough law for this rms is soially optimal. If the new rms have good
produtivity, then the possibility of liquidation is low, and government does not
have to be afraid of unemployment osts even under the tough law. On the other
hand, the tough law enourages managers as it dereases the payo in the ase of
a failure. In this ase, our assumption is that the produtivity of the new rms is
so high that motivating the managers to exert high eort is more protable than
the osts aused by a higher liquidation rate (2.20):
qhR− (1− qh)αN(U − L) > qlR (2.20)
On the other hand, we assume that the produtivity in the old rms is so low, that
the soial value of the old rms under the tough law that enourages managers to
hoose high eort is smaller than the value under the soft law α (2.21).
phR− (1− ph)αH(U − L) < plR− (1− pl)αN(U − L) (2.21)
As the left hand side is stritly inreasing and ontinuous in ph, there exists px
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suh that for ph < px assumption (2.21) holds. In other words, this assumption
says that enouraging high eort in the old rms is too expensive and it is more
protable to implement softer law and aept low eort in these rms. It follows
that the bankrupty law αH annot be optimal. For the new rms αN is enough
to enourage high eort, any higher level of α just inreases the osts of unem-
ployment. Then we have to ompare only the bankrupty law levels α = 0 and
α = αN .
First, we onsider the point where there is no privatization (y = 0) and in the
eonomy there are only publily owned old rms and private new rms. Given
our assumption (2.20), in point y = 0, G(α = αN) > G(α = 0).
Now we ompare the government's payos G(α = αN) and G(α = 0) for all
levels of privatization y.
Gα=αN −Gα=0 = x[plR− y(1− pl)αN(U − L)]
+ (1− x)[qhR− (1− qh)αN(U − L)]− xplR + (1− x)qlR
= (1− x)[(qh − ql)R− (1− qh)αN(U − L)]
− xy(1− pl)αN(U − L) (2.22)
The payo G(α = αN) is dereasing in y. Therefore, we an nd yx, suh that
yx =
(1− x)((qh − ql)R− (1− qh)αN(U − L))
(1− pl)αNx(U − L)
(2.23)
y < yx : G(α = αN) > G(α = 0)
y > yx : G(α = αN) < G(α = 0)
The analysis an be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3. If the probability of suess by old rms is smaller than px,
then for privatization level y > yx soft bankrupty law α = 0 is preferred and for
y < yx tougher bankrupty law α = αN is preferred.
39
We obtain a similar result as in the previous senario, if the privatization level
is below some threshold, the government prefers tough law, if the privatization
is larger, the government opts for soft bankrupty law. The example is shown
in Figure 2.3. The gure depits the government's payo for tough (α = αN)
and soft (α = 0) bankrupty law. We an see that the government prefers the
tough bankrupty for low levels of privatization and the soft law for high levels of
privatization. We an also show that the optimal poliy depends on the share of
new ompanies in the eonomy.









Figure 2.3: Government payo, x = 0.9;R = 5;U = 5; ph = 2/3; qh = 3/4; pl =
ql = 1/3;B = 4;L = 3.5; c = 4; e = 1
Proposition 2.4. The tougher bankrupty law is preferred:
• the higher is the probability of suess qh,
• the lower is the probability ql(= pl),
• the lower are the unemployment osts U ,
• the higher is the return of the projet R,
• the higher is the liquidation value L,
• and the lower is the share of old enterprizes x.
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Proof. The higher is the yx the more probable is, given the level of privatization,
implementation of the tougher bankrupty law αN rather than the soft bank-
rupty law α = 0. Keeping in mind that αN is dereasing in qh, dereasing in R,
inreasing in ql and dereasing in private benet B and liquidation value L, we
an immediately prove this proposition from partial derivation of yx with respet
to a orresponding variable.
The tough bankrupty law inuenes positively from the soial point of view
only the new enterprises, it enourages the entrepreneur to exert more eort and
dereases the prie of redit for him. As new enterprises are less likely to be
unsuessful, they produe lower osts of unemployment than the old rms. It is
lear that if there are more new rms in the eonomy beneting from the tough
law, tougher bankrupty law is more likely to be adopted. If the share of the
privatized rms is relatively small or the share of the new enterprises is relatively
large, then it is protable to enourage high eort in the new rms beause the
osts by old enterprises due to the higher level of liquidation rate are outweighed
by the gains in produtivity by new rms. However, if the share of privatized rms
is large and the share of old rms is large, then implementing tough law would
ause large unemployment osts, and then soft bankrupty law is preferred. If the
protability of old rms is low enough (ph < px) it is never protable to enourage
high eort in old privatized rms.
If the probability of suess of old rms rises suiently with higher eort
(ph > px), then also for old privatized rms, implementing tough bankrupty
law indues high eort whih is protable, beause the gains from high eort
are larger than alternative unemployment osts in ase of failure. In this ase,
the option with tough law αH implementing high eort in old rms dominates
the option of bankrupty law αN only if the share of the old rms is not large
enough. Implementing αH inreases the soial osts by new rms (it is higher
than αN). If the share of new rms is large, then the osts of implementation
αH (unemployment osts by new rms) might be larger than the gains (higher
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protability of old privatized rms).
2.5 Example ases: Czeh Republi and Hungary
We have shown that the the optimal level of the bankrupty law dereases with the
share of private property. If we assume the privatization deision as given, then
we are able to explain dierenes between transition ountries in the toughness
of their bankrupty law. The Czeh Republi is a prime example of very fast
privatization using the method of mass privatization. In ontrast, Hungary has
hosen relatively slower way of privatization via diret sales. At the same time,
the Czeh Republi adopted a very soft bankrupty law, in the early stage of
transition even introduing a protetion period, when rms were not in fat able
to be liquidated (Diblík, 2004). On the other hand, Hungary implemented in 1991
an extremely tough bankrupty law with an automati trigger, when the managers
of rms that held overdue debts of any size to any reditor were required to initiate
bankrupty proedure (Bonin and Shaer (1999), Janda (2004)). This law was
softened in 1993. We an observe many dierenes in the bankrupty law design
in Hungary and in the Czeh Republi during the 1990's. Aording to Mithell
(1998), the bankrupty law in the Czeh Republi imposed high bankrupty osts
on reditors, resulting in a lower number of bankrupty lings than in Hungary.
Today, the privatization levels in both ountries are very similar. However, the
large dierene in the level of reditor's protetion in the bankrupty law still
remains, the Czeh Republi bankrupty law is onsidered to be very soft, while
Hungarian one belongs to the toughest among transition ountries.
The bankrupty law is usually onsidered as a tool against ineient liqui-
dation. In this ontext, we an distinguish between an eonomi and nanial
distress. If the rm was unsuessful beause of the eonomi distress, this means,
that rm's assets were not used eiently and in this ase, it is better when the
rm is liquidated and rm's assets are sold. On the other hand, nanial distress
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is usually some kind of external shok inuening the apital struture (Knot and
Vyhodil, 2004). For example, during the period of nanial risis in Asia, eo-
nomially sound rms might beame insolvent as their debts where denominated
in foreign urreny and the loal urreny depreiated. If we look at the situa-
tion in transition ountries, privatization plays a ruial role. In these ountries,
the situation hanged dramatially and rms might have beome insolvent not
neessarily beause of eonomi ineieny but beause of the transition of the
eonomy. For example, many rms beame insolvent beause of trade arrears
(Berglöf and Roland, 1998). These rms ould not pay their suppliers, beause
their ustomers did not pay them. This led to an aumulation of arrears and
many suppliers were de fato lending their lients. As the rms were privately
owned, the government had less opportunity to subsidize these rms and there-
fore, privatization might have led to strengthening the problem of trade arrears.
This makes the liquidation more likely and inreases the osts of privatization.
The soft bankrupty law then redues the problem of ineient liquidation due
to trade arrears.
2.5.1 Privatization level
Our analysis is done under the assumption that the privatization level is given.
We justify it by the fat that the privatization deision is usually done by one
government and it is hard to reverse the deision by the following government.
The bankrupty law an relatively easily be hanged within one eletion period. In
transition ountries, the privatization program was prepared by one government
and was followed also by the next governments. In the ase of bankrupty law,
for example, the Czeh Republi has amended the insolveny law thirteen times
between 1990-2004 (Diblík, 2004).
In addition, there were limited alternatives to privatization deisions. Hungary
at the beginning of the transition period faed a relatively large foreign debt
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(EBRD, 1999) and the privatization deision in Hungary ould have been driven by
this onstraint. Hungary needed ash to repay the debt and hose the privatization
method of diret sales, largely to foreign investors. On the other hand, the Czeh
republi put a high emphasis on fast progress of the reforms and hose a method of
mass privatization whih does not generate inome for a government's budget. The
ruial dierene is, that diret sales annot be done as fast as mass privatization,
as there is a need to nd strategi investors. As Hungary ould not privatize so
fast, it hose a relatively low share of publi property in the early stage.
The speed of privatization must not neessarily be determined by restrition.
Another reason might lie in ideologial bakground. Some ountries have hosen
gradualisti way of reforms and others have hosen the shok therapy.
2.5.2 Initial onditions of reforms
Initial onditions of reforms ould also inuene the deision about the bankrupty
law. We have shown in our extension with new and old enterprises that with
higher share of new private rms, tougher law is more likely to be implemented.
In Hungary, the reforms of the soialisti system started already in late 1980's
and in time of sudden politial hanges, there were already new private rms
operating to some extend. First reforms in the Czeh Republi were trigged after
the break up of ommunist power (Mejstrik, 1996). At the time of implementation
of the bankrupty law, the share of new rms was muh larger in Hungary than
in the Czeh Republi. Our model predits, that the Hungarian government
had more inentives to implement a tough bankrupty law than the Czeh one.
Furthermore, as the private setor of the new rms was already established to
some extent in Hungary, it was more prepared to absorb dismissed people from
state owned enterprizes losed beause of tough bankrupty law. The number of
private rms might therefore inuene also the level of unemployment osts.
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2.5.3 Restruturing
Czeh rms were relative less suessful in restruturing than Hungarian rms
(Mejstrik, 1996). This dierene might be due to the privatization method, as
they were sold (given for free) mostly to domesti owners, without any initial
apital. Lak of apital and know-how makes the probability of failure higher
as the rms were less stable in periods of nanial distress. On the other hand,
Hungary privatized their rms often to foreign owners (EBRD, 1999). These
owners ould help the ompany to invest into new tehnologies, brought more
eetive orporate governane and helped the rm in times of nanial problems.
The bankrupty law aets an entrepreneur's eort and this an be interpreted
also as restruturing inentives. This might have led to very poor restruturing in
the Czeh Republi, the rms were privatized, but the owners had less inentives
under the weak bankrupty law to restruture the ompany than owners under
the tough law. This ould ause the inrease in produtivity in Hungary leading
into high privatization level in Hungary in the next period. The osts of unem-
ployment are large at the beginning and under suessful privatization, the osts
derease in time - with restruturing. In the Czeh Republi instead, less restru-
turing took plae leading to a slower derease in unemployment osts (EBRD,
1999). Therefore, the Czeh Republi still opts for the soft law, while Hungary's
privatization to foreign investors has improved this ondition and Hungary prefers
now a tough law, even with relatively high portion of private property.
2.5.4 Developed ountries vs. transition ountries
Developed ountries have relatively tougher bankrupty laws in omparison to
transition ountries (Pistor et al., 2000). This might be explained by a higher
produtivity of rms and quality of institutions that are usually better in mature
eonomies. We an also understand improved institutions, for example, as a better
orporate governane. Better institutions allow a manager to better inuene the
45
performane of the rm (Börner, 2004). The institutions might also inuene the
liquidation value L that banks reeive in ase of liquidation. The better the law
enforement, the higher is L and the more likely is the high eort implemented.
With higher eort implemented the probability of suess is ph and the tougher
law is more likely. If the probabilities are high enough (ph > px), enouraging
eort in publi rms might be protable and the government prefers a tough
bankrupty law and this refers to the ase of developed ountries.
2.6 Empirial evidene
2.6.1 Privatization level in transition ountries
In this setion we present some empirial evidene, supporting the results of our
model. The setion uses ross-setional data from EBRD Transition Report 2004,
that is devoted to a problem of insolveny law in transition ountries. The data set
is based on a survey, where experts from all ountries evaluated extensiveness and
eetiveness of bankrupty law. Extensiveness evaluates, what is the quality of
the bankrupty law aording to the ode of law, while the eetiveness measures,
how the law is in fat implemented and enfored in reality. For our purposes we
are going to use aggregate measure of the eetiveness (Effec) of the bankrupty
law in eah ountry ontaining measures for speed, enforement and transpareny
of the bankrupty law. The eetiveness of the bankrupty is losely onneted
to the toughness of the law as proedures that are faster, more transparent and
less ostly are onsidered to protet the reditor's rights better. We use the
eetiveness measure as a proxy for the toughness of the law in our model.
Data about privatization are also from EBRD statistis. First, we use the
EBRD index of privatization progress for large-sale and small-sale enterprizes
that ranges from 1 to 4, where 1 denotes little, and 4 denotes full privatization
of enterprizes (more than 75% privately-owned apital with eetive management
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ontrol). The data set is from 2003. Seond, we use measures of private setor
share of GDP in 2003. However, this measure does not reet exatly how muh
has the ountry privatized, beause it annot distinguish between privatized SOE
rms and newly established rms. The basi empirial model might be written
as:
Effeci = β0 + β1Privatizationi + c · Controlsi + ǫi (2.24)
Where Effec denotes eetiveness of bankrupty law, Privatization is a mea-
sure of extent of privatization, Contorls is a vetor of ontrol variables and ǫ is
an error term. We ran a number of regressions with Effec as the dependent
variable, the results are reported in Table 2.1 in Appendix.
Table 2.1: Privatization and the eetiveness of the bankrupty law
Variable OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 OLS 4
Interept 87.323*** 78.631*** 95.279** 26.957**
(14.441) (10.218) (33.512) (26.124)
Privatization progress -4.961* -15.257***
(2.512) (3.168)
Private share -0.415** -0.538*
(0.200) (0.254)
GDP 0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.0002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001)








R2 0.149 0.169 0.772 0.529
F statistis 1.95 2.17 23.87 2.14
Number of observations 24 24 18 18
Robust standard error in parentheses
* signiant at 10%; ** signiant at 5%; *** signiant at 1%
The oeient measuring the progress of privatization is negative and signi-
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ant at the 10% signiane level in the speiation using only GDP as a ontrol
variable. If we use other ontrol variables, the signiane rises to the 1% level.
Looking at the measure for the private setor as a proxy for privatization, we see
that this is signiant at the 5%, or 10% level respetively. As a ontrol variables
we have used: index of ivil liberties onstruted by the organization Freedom
House (www.freedomhouse.org), that measures rights of the itizens to express
their views from 1 (free) to 7 (not free), orruption pereption index as a mea-
sure of orruption onstruted by Transpareny International ranging between 0
(highly orrupt) and 10 (highly lean) and a measure of rule of law aording to
the index of EBRD. As a last ontrol variable we used an inequality measure-
ment as a dierene in the Gini index in the ountry between year 1989 and 1999,
athing the eet of inrease of inequality in transition ountries. All the ontrol
variables are signiant at least at the 10% signiane level. Higher ivil liberties,
lower orruption and better rule of law are positively orrelated with eetiveness
of bankrupty law. The inequality variable has an interesting interpretation. The
higher is the inrease of inequality, the more eetive is the bankrupty law. This
supports the argument of Biais and Mariotti (2003), that ountries with a larger
share of poor people hoose a tougher law, beause under soft law the poor people
would be redit rationed from the market.
2.6.2 Privatization method
Another possible approah is to onsider not the level of privatization, but the
method of privatization. The basi idea behind our model is that the government
loses the power to ontrol employment in privatized rms and therefore might
be more motivated to adopt a soft bankrupty law. We an then distinguish
privatization methods aording to the fat, how they allow the government to
ontrol the unemployment level. If the government uses the method of mass
privatization, where all property is given to the entire soiety, the government an
hardly inuene, who will ontrol this ompany at the end of the privatization
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proess and there is a high risk that this ompany might be shut down by a new
owner. If the government uses the method of diret sale, it an be more sure
that the ompany will not be liquidated, beause they know to whom they are
selling this ompany. With this argumentation, we would expet the government
that implements the mass privatization method to adopt rather a soft law and
the government preferring diret sales or management buy-outs should tend more
to a tough law. We onstrut a dummy that equals 1, if the ountry had mass
privatization as dominant method and 0 otherwise and regress this variable on the
eetiveness of the bankrupty law. The basi empirial model might be written
as:
Effeci = β0 + β1Methodi + c · Controlsi + ǫi (2.25)
Effec denotes again eetiveness of the bankrupty law, Method is a dummy
for privatization method, Contorls is a vetor of ontrol variables and ǫ is an error
term. We ran regressions, where Effec is the dependent variable, the results are
reported in Table 2.2 in Appendix. Regressions were run again using robust
tehniques to orret for heterosedastiity.
The oeient of privatization method is negative and signiant at the 10%
and 5% signiane level respetively. We used the same ontrol variables as in
the previous example; in this ase, only the oeient of inequality measurement
is signiant at the 1 % signiane level. We have shown that in both examples
that the privatization level and mass privatization, respetively are negatively
orrelated with the eetiveness of the bankrupty law supporting the preditions
of our model.
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Table 2.2: Method of privatization and the eetiveness of the bankrupty law
Variable OLS 1 OLS 2















F statistis 1.89 2.73
Number of observations 25 18
Robust standard error in parentheses
* signiant at 10%; ** signiant at 5%; *** signiant at 1%
2.6.3 Extensiveness of the bankrupty law
If we onsider extensiveness of the bankrupty law instead of the eetiveness,
neither privatization level nor privatization method has a signiant inuene on
the extensiveness of bankrupty law. This result is in line with ndings of Pistor
et al. (2000) and Pistor (2000) that the quality of ontrat enforement and law
eetiveness is muh more important in transition ountries than the law itself.
2.7 Conlusions
The average liquidation of a ompany, aording to the World Bank study from
2004
4
, takes 9 years in the Czeh Republi. In Hungary the same proess takes 2




the bankrupty law in ontext of the privatization deision may help to understand
the dierenes among transition ountries in Eastern Europe. From our analysis
we an provide a following explanation. If the privatization level is high, leading
to high unemployment osts, the government rather prefers to lower the number
of liquidations via softening the bankrupty law. If the privatization level is low,
resulting in lower unemployment osts, it pays o to rather motivate the managers
with a tough bankrupty law and allow for higher level of liquidation.
The ountries with a larger share of private new rms at the beginning of the
transition are more likely to adopt a tough bankrupty to enourage entrepreneurs
in the new rms with more inentives. However, if the privatization level is high,
there are many old private rms that are very likely to go bankrupt under the
tough bankrupty law produing large osts of unemployment. If the eet of
new rms is not large enough, the government rather prefers a soft law avoiding
a high liquidation rate among old privatized rms. Keeping the old ineient
rms under state-ownership allows the government to ontrol the unemployment
in these rms and a tough law is more likely to be implemented.
The Czeh government has hosen a very fast way of privatization and then it
tried to soften the negative eets of privatization by implementing a soft bank-
rupty law limiting the number of liquidations. A seond level of inuene were
state-owned banks that were granting redits without muh emphasis on prof-
itability. On the other hand, ountries that proeeded slower in the privatization
proess ould aord more market oriented poliies in other setors, as the threat
of liquidation of privatized rms was not so severe. As our empirial evidene
suggests, the privatization hoie is negatively orrelated with a toughness of
bankrupty law in transition ountries.
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2.A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.2
Proof. The proof for B, R, L and c follows diretly from the partial derivations
of the expression (2.8). We onsider only the ase, when a > 0, i.e. c(ph − pl) +
ph(e−R(ph − pl)) > 0
Considering the inuene of probability of suess ph on the minimal level of
α implementing high eort, the inentive ompatibility onstraint of the entre-






≥ 0. This expression is inreasing and ontinuous in a and on
the interval where ph > pl, it is also stritly inreasing and ontinuous in ph. This
implies that αH is dereasing in ph.
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. To determine the optimal bankrupty law, we an again restrit our atten-
tion to two ases - α = 0 and α = αH . If 0 < α < αH it is not high enough to
implement high eort, and beause higher α inreases the osts of unemployment,
it is optimal to hoose the lowest level. The same argumentation holds for the
ase α > αH . Higher α does not inrease the eort exerted, it only inreases the
osts of unemployment.
If α = 0 then (assuming that αH > 0) no eort is implemented and, in
this ase, the payo of the government is onstant for all levels of privatization
G(α = 0) = plR. As there are no osts of unemployment (α = 0) and neither
publi nor private rms hoose high eort, the payo is onstant in y.
In the ase α = αH , the government's payo an be rearranged:
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GαH = y((ph − pl)R− (1− ph)αH(U [y]− L)) + plR− c (2.26)
Comparing G(α = 0) and G(α = αH), we an write
G(α = αH)−G(α = 0) = y((ph − pl)R− (1− ph)αH(U [y]− L)) (2.27)
If this expression is positive, G(α = αH) is larger and tougher bankrupty
law is preferred. If the expression is negative, then the soft bankrupty law is
preferred. There are three possible ases:
1. The unemployment osts are relatively high even for very low privatization
levels. If U(y = 0) > (ph−pl)R
(1−ph)αH
+ L, then given the fat U ′[y] > 0 expression
(2.26) is negative for any y larger and G(α = 0) > G(α = αH). In this ase
a soft law is preferred for all levels of privatization.
2. The unemployment osts are relatively low even for a very high privatization
level. If U(y = 1) < (ph−pl)R
(1−ph)αH
+ L, then given the fat U ′[y] > 0 expression
(2.26) is positive for any y smaller and G(α = αH < G(α = 0)). In this ase
a tough law is preferred for all levels of privatization.
3. The last ase is when the unemployment osts are relatively small for low
levels of privatization and beome relatively large in the ase of large pri-
vatization level. One the expression (2.27) beomes negative for some y, it
stays negative for any larger y. In other words, one is the soft law preferred
for some level of privatization, it is also preferred for any larger y.
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Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. Proof follows diretly from partial derivation of the expression (2.27) that
ompares the government's payo for α = 0 and the government's payo for
α = αH .
∂G(α = αH)−G(α = 0)
∂U
= −(1− ph)yαH < 0 (2.28)
54
Chapter 3
Bankrupty Laws and Debt
Renegotiation
3.1 Introdution
Bankrupty laws are reognized as fundamental institutions neessary for growth
of redit markets and entrepreneurship (Aghion et al., 1992). They dene the
rules and proedures under whih a reditor an take possession of entrepreneur's
assets and hene diretly inuene the reditor's inentives to liquidate an insol-
vent ompany. Ideally, a bankrupty law should protet reditors, impose nanial
disipline on managers, indue restruturing, and free assets from ineient use
Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. (2000). However, there is no lear agreement on the
optimal bankrupty law design. Moreover, bankrupty laws dier aross ountries
substantially along many dimensions suh as alloation of ontrol rights, prior-
ity rules or the role of judges and ourts. Not surprisingly, it is unlikely that a




Hart (2000) notes that It is unlikely that one size ts all... Whih proedure a ountry
hooses or should hoose may then depend on the other fators, e.g. the ountry's institutional
struture or legal tradition. One an also imagine a ountry hoosing a menu of proedures and
allowing rms to selet among them. It is important to reognize that bankrupty reform should
not be seen in isolation: it may be neessary to ombine it with legal and other reforms, e.g.
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bankrupty law designs have dierent eets on the number of liquidations in
the ountry. Claessens and Klapper (2005) observe dierent eets of the bank-
rupty law on the number of liquidations with respet to dierent quality of law
enforement.
Given the role of the bankrupty law to protet reditors, we onsider a bank-
rupty law to be a one-dimensional variable that inuenes reditor's expeted
value of assets that an be reovered. High values orrespond to a tough bank-
rupty law giving the reditor substantial rights, while low values represent low
protetion of reditor's rights (Biais and Mariotti, 2003). We analyze the eet
of the bankrupty law on the number of liquidations in a simple model of bor-
rowing and lending with asymmetri information, where due to the possibility of
renegotiation the reditor annot redibly ommit to liquidate the debtor if the
default ours. Our model is based on Bester (1994) and we modify the rene-
gotiation stage aording to the soft budget onstraint literature (Berglöf and
Roland, 1997). The environment is designed as follows: there is one entrepreneur
who needs to raise apital to nane a risky projet. The projet is naned by
a reditor, who annot observe whether the projet was suessful or not. The
bankrupty law allows the reditor to liquidate the debtor's rm (take possession
of debtor's assets) in ase the entrepreneur defaults and does not pay bak the
debt. Without the possibility of liquidation, the entrepreneur does not have any
inentive to pay bak the debt. The model aptures the prinipal-agent problem
between the reditor and the debtor, where both parties have symmetri infor-
mation about the ex-ante protability of the projet, but the absene of state
veriation reates the informational asymmetry at the time the projet is real-
ized. Due to the fat that the rm an make a renegotiation oer, the reditor
annot ommit to liquidate an insolvent rm. If the reditor aepts the oer,
the debtor avoids the liquidation and this option soften the debtor's hard budget
onstraint reated by the bankrupty law, as the entrepreneur knows that the
the training of judges, improvements in orporate governane and the strengthening of investors
rights, and possibly even hanges in the international nanial system.
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unsuessful projet may not be liquidated.
As in hapter 2, we fous on studying the bankrupty law, onsidering ex-ante
and ex-post eets. The analysis of bankrupty law often fouses on the ex-post
eets, i.e. how the bankrupty law inuenes the value of an insolvent ompany.
However, in our model we onsider ex-ante eets, i.e. the eets on the behavior
of the agents before the bankrupty ours.
2
There is a growing literature on the optimal bankrupty law. Our paper is
related to this literature in several ways. Berkovith et al. (1998) onsider the
eets of bankrupty law on ex ante deision making taking into aount debt
ontrat renegotiating. They derive the optimal bankrupty law that implements
ex-ante eient solution. They present two restritions on the bargaining game
between the laimants that the bankrupty ourt an use to prevent strategi
default by a debtor. However, their model does not onsider the eet of the
existene of soft budget onstraint on the reditor's and debtor's deision making
and the ex-post eets, namely the atual liquidation rates.
The bankrupty law inuenes the value of the ollateral for the reditor, there-
fore the role of the ollateral is impliitly expressed in the bankrupty law. In the
theoretial literature it was shown that the ollateral is used to solve the problems
resulting from asymmetri information - state veriation (Bester, 1994), moral
hazard (Bester, 1985), adverse seletion (Biais and Mariotti, 2003). Bester (1994)
investigates how the prospet of debt renegotiation aets both the reditor's and
the debtor's behavior. As in our model, the renegotiation ours beause the
2
The ex-post eieny requires that the bankrupty law maximizes the value of the insolvent
rm for all stakeholder. If we onsider the tough bankrupty law giving substantial right to
reditors, suh a law does not neessarily maximize the soial welfare. Berkovith and Israel
(1999) argue that the managers in the rm might have better information and atually anelling
a part of the debt and keeping the management in power might be soially optimal. Biais and
Mariotti (2003) mentions that the reditor might not internalize all the eet of liquidation, e.g.
the unemployment osts that arise due to the rm liquidation. On other hand analyzing the
problem from the ex-ante point of view, soft bankrupty laws inuene the management ations
and this make the ontrating of debt naning in prinipal-agent setting even more severe. The
managers prot from ontinuation of the projet as they an extrat the residual ash ow and
private benets. The tough bankrupty law that gives the reditor substantial rights makes the
liquidation more protable for reditor thus makes the ontinuation less likely.
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absene of preommitment preludes a redible bankrupty threat. Bester shows
that the problem an be mitigated by ollateralized assets. Although the ollat-
eralization inreases the total amount of liquidated assets, it may derease the
expeted dead-weight loss assoiated with asset liquidation. This eet is larger
for low-eient rms and therefore these have more inentives to post ollateral
than high-eient rms. Our setting diers from Bester's in modelling the re-
naning stage and we treat the bankrupty law as an endogenous variable. The
bankrupty law in Bester's setting does not aet the number of liquidations as
the reditor has in the renegotiation stage full bargaining power and he an in
the renegotiation always get the value of ollateral. The toughness of bankrupty
law then does not inuene the reditor's deision between liquidation or rene-
gotiation. Janda (2004) analyzes a similar setting as Bester (1994) taking into
onsideration asymmetri information between the entrepreneur and the reditor
about the ex-ante quality of the projet. He nds that renegotiation does not pre-
lude the use of ollateral as a sreening devie in the presene of adverse seletion
problem.
Hainz (2004) studies how the is the number of bankrupties inuened by the
quality of institutions in a model of bank-rm relationship. She nds that a bank
reeives the payo if a rm is liquidated, but loses the rent from inumbent us-
tomers due to its informational advantage. There exists a range where improving
institutions may derease the number of liquidations.
The soft budget onstraint (SBC) problem relates to the bankrupty law via
the reditor's impossibility to preommit not to renegotiate the ontrat. A soft
budget onstraint is dened as a relationship when an organization annot ommit
not to subsidize the organization with a budget onstraint if the laims exeed the
budget onstraint, see (Kornai et al., 2003). In some sense we an regard a reditor
deision not to liquidate an insolvent rm as a form of subsidy. Maskin and
Xu (2001) and Berglöf and Roland (1997) treat SBC as a nanial ommitment
problem of not imposing bankrupty on the defaulted entrepreneur.
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In our model we nd that there exists an interval in the toughness of the
bankrupty law, within whih the law has a negative eet on a liquidation rate,
i.e. the probability the rm is liquidated dereases with the toughness of the
bankrupty law. In addition, we analyze the eet of the bankrupty law on the
liquidation rate for dierent levels of ompetition. We nd a higher liquidation
rate in less ompetitive redit markets. We also onsider a government's hoie of
an optimal bankrupty law maximizing the soial welfare. We nd that the opti-
mal toughness of the bankrupty law depends on the extent of liquidation osts.
We further nd that a possibility of renegotiation may inrease the soial surplus,
as less rms are liquidated. Our results are supported by empirial evidene on
the atual use of bankrupty around the world. Using a dataset of 32 ountries
(Claessens and Klapper, 2005), we study the eet of the level of toughness of
the bankrupty law and the eet of dierent levels of ompetition in the banking
market on the number of liquidations.
The hapter is organized as follows. Setion 3.2 desribes the speiation of
the model. Setion 3.3 haraterizes the solution of the bargaining game between
the debtor (rm) and the reditor in the ase with and without renegotiation.
Setion 3.4 analyzes the hoie of soially optimal level of bankrupty law for dif-
ferent degrees of ompetition in the redit market. Setion 3.5 provides empirial
evidene supporting the results of the model. In setion 3.6 we summarize the
main results of the hapter.
3.2 Setup
3.2.1 Bankrupty law
Our modeling of the bankrupty law is motivated by Biais and Mariotti (2003).
We denote the toughness of the bankrupty law in our model as a one-dimensional
variable α on the spae [0,1℄. If the bankrupty law is equal 1, this is a very tough
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law. Whenever the rm is insolvent, it is liquidated and the reditor gets the
full ollateral. On the other hand, if the bankrupty law is equal to 0, then the
insolvent rm is never liquidated.
Expressing the bankrupty law by one variable an be justied in several ways:
we an see the toughness of the bankrupty law as a level of disretion given to
the judge or as a probability that the bankrupty proedure will be started.
3
The
bankrupty law that gives little disretion power to the judge is seen as a tough
law, an extreme example of no disretion is an automati trigger on bankrupties.
This provision (e.g. in Hungary between 1991 - 1993) requires the rm whih
holds overdue debts of any size to any reditor to initiate bankrupty (see Janda
(2004)).
3.2.2 Model
In our model we onsider an eonomy onsisting of a risk-neutral entrepreneur
(a rm), a reditor and a government that designs the bankrupty law. The
entrepreneur needs funds to nane the projet. The projet yields return R with
probability p and yields 0 with probability 1−p, the osts of the projet are I. The
outome of the projet annot be observed by the reditor. The expeted value
of the projet is positive, i.e. pR− I > 0. The rm asks for redit C to a reditor
to over the whole investment osts, i.e. C = I. If the projet is suessful, the
entrepreneur is supposed to pay bak the endogenously determined prie of the
redit T . Stages of the game are as follows:
In the rst stage, the government sets up the bankrupty law α.
In the seond stage nature deides whether the rm is suessful or not in
3
Cornelli and Felli (1997b) and Giammarino and Nosal (1999) argue that dierent bankrupty
law provisions might have dierent eets on the player's behavior. For example, the monitoring
inentives of the reditor may or may not be ompatible with a proedure that either always
omplies with or always violates absolute priority rule and therefore it might be diult to asses
the bankrupty law in a one-dimensional manner.
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performing the projet. The entrepreneur obtains from the reditor a redit I
to over the osts of the projet and the prie T he is supposed to pay bak is
determined. In the analysis, we onsider how dierent levels of ompetition in
redit market inuene the prie.
In the third stage, the unsuessful rm has to laim default. The suessful
rm an deide whether to laim being suessful and pay bak the redit or
to laim default. It hooses a possibly mixed strategy so that it defaults with
probability d ∈ [0, 1] and pays bak the redit with probability 1 − d (d as a
default rate). In ase the rm delares default, it does not pay bak the debt and
the reditor has the right to seize the assets of the rm, i.e. the bank an take
possession of the ollateral and the return of the projet.
The expeted value of ollateral for the reditor is determined by the toughness
of the bankrupty law. If the reditor liquidates the rm, he obtains a liquidation
value αL. Taking over the projet by the reditor inorporates some dead-weight
loss as well, namely γ ∈ [0, 1]. The reditor valuation of the suessful and un-
suessful projet is then γR and 0, respetively. We also assume that I > L, the
reditor annot reover the full ost of the projet in ase of projet failure. As
the projet realization is not observable for the reditor, the payment obligation
T annot be onditioned on the result of the projet. Whenever the rm is liq-
uidated, the manager loses a non-transferable private benet B. We assume that
B > L, whih results in a fat that liquidation is ineient. This assumption is
motivated by our fous on a soft bankrupty law, whih is often justied as a way
to avoid ineient liquidation (Biais and Raasens, 2000).
4
Sine the entrepre-
neur has information about the outome of the projet, he needs some inentives
to pay bak T when the projet is suessful. These inentives are reated by the
reditor's right to liquidate the rm, in ase he delares default. The threat of
liquidation makes the debtor pay bak the debt. However, there is still plae for
4
The assumption does not seem to be unrealisti if we inorporate in the parameterB also the
soial osts of liquidation. However, for brevity of notation we abstain from a spei parameter.
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renegotiation as the liquidation is ineient. Renegotiation has a negative eet
on the debtor's inentive to pay bak the debt.
In the fourth stage, the reditor deides whether to aept the renaning
oer of the defaulted rm or liquidate the rm and obtain remaining assets of the
rm. We again allow for random strategy, the reditor aepts the renaning
oer and does not liquidate the rm with probability 1− b and liquidates the rm
with probability b (b as a bankrupty rate). The renegotiation oer is modelled
as follows. We assume that eah projet generates the ertain return of X if this
projet is renaned with additional investment I, making the net prot R0.
5
Assume that the renegotiation oer from a rm is: Renane us with addi-
tional apital and we will pay you for sure the net prot R0. The manager does
not have to oer neessarily the whole return of the renaned projet X, however
he still has a motivation to make this renegotiation oer beause with renaning
the rm is not liquidated and he does not lose his private benet B. The spe-
iation of renaning is motivated by Berglöf and Roland (1997). We assume
that the net renegotiation oer R0 does not reover the osts of the projet, i.e.
R0 < I. We also assume that the renaning oer is never larger than the ol-
lateral, i.e. R0 < L.
6
The renaning option is ineient for the reditor ex-ante
(the reditor annot reover the osts of the investment), but might be eient in
the stage, when the rm turns out to be insolvent if the value of the renaning
oer is higher than the expeted liquidation value of the ollateral. The reditor's
hoie whether to aept the renaning oer depends on the expeted liquidation
value that is inuened by the toughness of the bankrupty law. The reditor an-
not observe whether the defaulted rm was suessful or not. The inentives to
liquidate a suessful rm are higher beause the reditor obtains by liquidation
not only the ollateral but also a part of the projet.
5
This assumption that eah projet an generate ertain return as part of the projet an be
saved if additional apital is invested
6
We want to fous only on a relevant parameter spae. If R0 would be larger than L, the
reditor would never use liquidation.
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The possibility of renaning implies that default will not always be penalized
by liquidation and both parties realize this. As the reditor annot ommit to
always liquidate the defaulted rm, suessful rm might use strategi default.
This means that the suessful rm does not pay bak the debt, laims default
and hopes the reditor aepts its renaning oer, and the rm keeps the return
of the projet. The strategi default inentives are weakened by posting ollat-
eral, beause it inreases the probability that the rm will be liquidated in ase
of default. Both players (the reditor and the entrepreneur) have symmetri in-
formation about the protability of the projet ex-ante, hene there is no adverse
seletion problem. Due to the presene of asymmetri information, the model is
solved using the perfet Bayesian equilibrium onept.
The game tree is presented in Figure 3.1, the timing of the game in Figure 3.2.
3.3 Optimal ontrat
3.3.1 Case without renegotiation
First, we analyze the ase if there is no renegotiation possible. This means that the
reditor always liquidates the defaulted ompany and the entrepreneur does not
have any inentives to delare strategi default as this would result in loss of the
private benet and outome of suessful projet for sure. Simply all unsuessful
rms (1 − p) will be liquidated. The liquidation rate does not depend on the
toughness of the bankrupty law α.
Proposition 3.1. Assume absene of renegotiation, when the reditor ommits
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The toughness of the bankrupty law does not inuenes the liquidation rate,
i.e. how many rms will be liquidated. As the entrepreneur knows that in the
ase of default the rm will be always liquidated he does not default strategially.
The toughness of the bankrupty law does not bring any additional inentives to
the entrepreneur to pay bak the debt. Therefore it is soially optimal to have
very tough law that minimizes the ost of the liquidation.
3.3.2 Case with renegotiation
In this setion we present the solution of the game between the debtor and the
reditor and we haraterize the optimal ontrat. The bankrupty law gives the
reditor the right to liquidate the rm that delared default. This devie gives
an inentive to the entrepreneur not to laim default in ase the projet was
suessful. If the rm ould not be liquidated, the entrepreneur would not lose
anything laiming default, moreover he retains the whole prot as he does not pay
bak the debt. However, being aware of the renaning option, the entrepreneur
might still laim default of the suessful projet and hope for renaning (i.e.
avoiding liquidation) even though the bankrupty law is present. In this sense the
renaning softens the hard budget onstraint reated by a bankrupty law.
Solving the game, we are looking for the perfet Bayesian equilibrium. Eah
agent's behavior has to be optimal given the other agent's behavior. The agent's
believes about the atual projet realization have to be onsistent with updated
prior probabilities aording to the Bayes' rule.
The posterior probability q(d) that the projet was suessful when default is






The reditor updates his believes when he observes a rm's ation (a rm laiming
default or not). The probability of strategi default d is derived endogenously
from the model. In equilibrium the reditor forms rational expetations and after
observing the default he onludes that the projet was suessful with probability
q(d) and unsuessful with (1− q(d)).
Proposition 3.2. The optimal deision of the debtor and the reditor about the
default and bankrupty is haraterized as follows:
• If the bankrupty law is soft, i.e. α < α1 =
R0−pγR
L
then the reditor never
liquidates the rm (b = 0) and the debtor always laims strategi default
(d = 1). No projet is naned.
• If the bankrupty law is tough, i.e. α > α2 =
R0
L
then the reditor always
liquidates the rm (b = 1) and the debtor never laims strategi default
(d = 0).











We an split the toughness of the bankrupty law into three intervals. We
regard the bankrupty law to be soft if α < α1 =
R0−pγR
L
. In this ase the
renaning oer is always preferred, i.e. the reditor always aepts the renaning
oer. However, the entrepreneur is aware of the fat that the reditor will never
liquidate the rm and therefore he always laims strategi default. The reditor's
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expeted prot is negative beause renaning is ex-ante non-protable and he
rather does not provide any funds at the rst plae. Hene, if the bankrupty law
is soft, i.e. α < α1, no projet is naned.
The bankrupty law is tough, if α > α2 =
R0
L
. In this ase, the reditor will
never aept the renaning oer beause the liquidation gives him a higher payo
even liquidating the unsuessful projet. Hene, the entrepreneur never laims
strategi default as this gives him learly negative payo. Only the unsuessful
projet is liquidated.
If the toughness of the bankrupty law lies between α1 and α2 we all it in-
termediate bankrupty law. In this interval it is protable for the reditor to
liquidate the suessful rm as the ollateral value plus the value of the projet
is higher than the renaning oer. Aepting the renaning oer is protable
for the reditor in ase the projet failed. However, as the reditor does not ob-
serve the return of the projet, he randomizes about his deision to liquidate or
to aept the renaning oer. The mixed strategy equilibrium desribed in the
Proposition 3.2 may be viewed as the belief of the two players onerning their
opponents' behavior. The equilibrium rate of b makes the suessful entrepreneur
indierent between paying bak the debt or faing the reditors hoie of aept-
ing the renegotiation oer or liquidation. The default rate d makes the reditor
indierent whether to liquidate the rm that laimed default or not.








As the toughness of the bankrupty law inreases, the renaning option beomes
less protable for the reditor ompared to the liquidation. The debtor is aware of
this fat and that leads to less use of strategi default. The prie of the redit T
does not inuene the probability of strategi default d∗, as this does not inuene
the reditor's deision about liquidation versus renaning. However, the prie of
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the redit positively inuenes the bankrupty rate b∗. If the prie of the redit T
is high, the suessful debtor an gain more not paying bak the debt, therefore
the reditor has to use bankrupty more often.
Optimal ontrat - renegotiation ase
In the previous setion we have found the optimal rm's deision about default and
optimal reditor's deision about bankrupty. Deisions about bankrupty and
strategi default are made in the last periods. Solving our problem by bakward
indution we now solve the optimum ontrat, given the equilibrium probabilities
of strategi default d∗ and the bankrupty rate b∗. We nd the optimal prie of
the redit for dierent levels of ompetition in the redit market. The payo of
the reditor is:
πcreditor = p(1− d
∗)T + (1− p+ pd∗)R0 − I (3.4)
The rm's payo is:
πfirm = p(R +B − T ) + (1− p)(1− b
∗)B (3.5)
First, we onsider the monopolisti redit market. We model the monopoly ase
suh as there is only one reditor and many rms that want to get a redit. This
gives the reditor large bargaining power.
Lemma 3.1. Assume a monopolisti redit market, where the reditor makes a
take-it-or-leave-it oer to the rm. The equilibrium prie of the redit T is equal
to
T ∗mon = R +B (3.6)
Proof. We set the partiipation onstraint of the rm equal to zero and solve for
T . We nd the highest prie of the redit T ∗mon, the rm an still pay.
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The reditor is able to extrat the whole surplus from the rm and brings it
to zero utility. The monopoly prie is then Tmon = R + B. This leads to the
bankrupty rate b∗ = 1. As the reditor extrats the whole surplus from the
entrepreneur, he is indierent whether to pay bak the redit or always laim
default. We assume that in equilibrium the rm always pays the redit bak.
Then, we obtain an equilibrium where the suessful rm always pays bak and
the unsuessful rm laims default and is always liquidated. This solves the
problem of the ommitment of the reditor. The monopolist does not neessarily
maximizes the soial surplus, as he does not internalize the dead weight loss aused
by liquidation. As mentioned above, if the monopolisti reditor extrats the
whole rent from the debtor, it is always protable to liquidate the rm. However, if
we assume that the monopolisti reditor does not extrat the whole rent from the
debtor, the liquidation from the point of the reditor will not always be optimal.
Dierent degrees of ompetition
We have shown that the maximum value the entrepreneur an pay for the redit
is T = R+B. In order to analyze dierent ompetition environments, we denote
the degree of ompetition in the redit market as θ. This variable expresses how
muh of the return of the projet the reditor obtains: high θ stands for low level
of ompetition, low θ stands for intensive ompetition. We express the prie of
the redit as
T ∗ = θ(R +B) (3.7)
If θ = 1, the reditor has absolute monopoly power and an extrat the whole
surplus of the projet from the entrepreneur, T = R +B.
In the partiular ase of perfet ompetition, where the whole surplus stays
with the rm and the reditor's partiipation onstraint is binding, the equilibrium
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prie of the redit T ∗com an be expressed as:
T ∗com = θmin(R +B) (3.8)
We fous only on the relevant parameter spae, when the partiipation onstraint
of the bank is positive. This gives us the interval of θ: [θmin, 1], where
θmin =
(αL−R0)I + γR(I − (1− p)R0)
(αL+ pγR−R0)(R +B)
(3.9)






A higher α leads to less strategi default d∗, and as the reditor prots from a
lower default rate, he aepts lower prie of the redit.
3.4 Optimal bankrupty law
In the previous setion we have determined the optimal ontrat. In this setion
we analyze the government's hoie of the toughness of the bankrupty law to
maximize soial welfare. Soial surplus is dened as the sum of all benets and
osts in the eonomy. In our model there is a need for bankrupty proedure
beause without the threat the entrepreneur has no inentives to delare that the
projet was suessful and pay bak the redit. To optimally set the level of the
toughness of the bankrupty law, the government has to take into aount two
eets of the bankrupty law that inuene soial welfare. First, there is a dead-
weight loss aused by liquidation (1− α)L; a higher level of α dereases this loss.
Seond, the toughness of the bankrupty law inuenes the probability that the
rm will be liquidated, the liquidation rate. We analyze the relationship between
the toughness of the bankrupty law and the liquidation rate in a separate setion.
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3.4.1 Liquidation rate
The probability that the rm will be liquidated (liquidation rate) depends not only
on the bankrupty rate, i.e. on the probability the reditor deides to liquidate,
but also on the probability of strategi default, i.e. on the probability the rm
will heat. It is easy to see that the liquidation rate β is:
β = b∗(1− p+ pd∗) (3.10)
To evaluate the eet of the toughness of bankrupty law on the liquidation rate we
study the separate eets on the bankrupty and default rate. If the bankrupty
law is relatively tough, making the liquidation option always protable for the
reditor, the optimal bankrupty rate is equal to zero and the optimal default
rate is equal to 1. This gives us a liquidation rate of 1 − p. This is exatly the
share of unsuessful rms. Under very soft law the optimal bankrupty rate
would be zero and the default rate equal to 1. However under these onditions no
projet will be naned in the formal bankrupty proedure setting.
The last ase lies in the interval of mixed strategies. The liquidation rate in
this ase is a funtion of the level of reditor's protetion (toughness of bankrupty




(1− p+ pd∗) (3.11)
Proposition 3.3. In the mixed strategy region (α ∈ (α1, α2)) the liquidation rate
β is lower in the more ompetitive redit market.
Proof. As the liquidation rate diers only by the prie of the redit T , it is obvious
that the liquidation rate is higher for higher θ.
If the reditor operates in a less ompetitive market he an ask for a larger
prie of the redit from the entrepreneur. A higher prie of the redit inreases the
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debtor inentives to use strategi default, beause the benet of default inreases
as the prie the debtor has to pay inreases. The reditor then has to punish
the debtor more often. Therefore, higher prie of the redit leads to a higher
bankrupty rate. It follows that the liquidation rate is higher for lower degrees of
ompetition.
Proposition 3.4. In the mixed strategy region (α ∈ (α1, α2)) the liquidation rate
β is negatively dependent on the toughness of the bankrupty law α.
Proof. See Appendix
The eet of the bankrupty law on the liquidation rate is twofold. First,
the toughness of the bankrupty law inuenes negatively the default rate d∗.
As the bankrupty law beomes tougher, the renegotiation option beomes less
attrative for the reditor, therefore the debtor is using strategi default less often,
d∗ dereases. Seond, the toughness of the bankrupty law aets the bankrupty
rate. However, the eet is valid only in the perfet ompetition setting. Tougher
bankrupty law inreases the reditor's payo and therefore he aepts a lower
prie of the redit T . This makes the option of strategi default less attrative
(the gain of not paying bak is lower) and the reditor does not have to use
bankrupty so often, the bankrupty rate b∗com dereases. In a less ompetitive
market, the bankrupty law does not inuene the bankrupty rate. Therefore the
additional eet on delining number of liquidation is laking leading to higher
liquidation rates. Now we ompare the liquidation rate in the mixed strategy
region (α ∈ (α1, α2)) with the region of the tough bankrupty law (α > α2).
Proposition 3.5. There exists αliq in the interval of mixed strategy (α ∈ (α1, α2))
suh that the liquidation rate β(αliq < α < α2) is smaller than the liquidation
rate under the tough bankrupty law (α > α2) for all degrees of ompetition θ,
θmin < θ < 1.
Proof. See Appendix
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This proposition shows us that the probability that the rm will be liquidated
(liquidation rate) in the mixed strategies region is lower than in the region of the
tough bankrupty law for ertain levels of α. In other words, there exists ertain
levels of α suh that the probability of being liquidated in the region of mixed
strategies is lower than the probability of being unsuessful.
The example of liquidation rate under limited ompetition (θ = 0.9 and θ =
0.6) is illustrated in Figure 3.3. The parameter θ expresses the distane between
the two liquidation rates (between solid and dash line).









Figure 3.3: Liquidation Rate with respet to the toughness of the bankrupty law:
R = 10;R0 = 3; I = 5; γ = 0.1; p = 0.5;L = 5;B = 1. Dashed line represents
liquidation rate under θ = 0.6, solid line stays for θ = 0.9.
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3.4.2 The government's hoie of the optimal bankrupty
law
As we mentioned, there is a need for bankrupty proedure beause without this
threat, the entrepreneur has no inentives to delare that the projet was suessful
and pay bak the redit. From the ex-post eieny it would be optimal not to
have any bankrupty law, so that the reditor always aepts the renegotiation
oer and never liquidates the rm. However, this would distort the entrepreneur's
inentive to admit being suessful and he always laims strategi default. The
question is how to balane the features of the bankrupty law suh that the osts
of the ineient bankrupty are the lowest (limitation of number of liquidations),
but the entrepreneur still has inentives not to heat the reditor.
The government's payo in the mixed strategy interval (intermediate bank-
rupty law, (α1, α2)) an be written:
Ginter = p(1− d
∗)(R +B) + pd∗b∗(αL+ γR) + (1− p)b∗αL
+ pd∗(1− b∗)(R +B +R0) + (1− p)(1− b




γL(1− p)R((B +R)θ −R0)
(α L+ γR−R0)2
> 0 , for θ ∈ (θmin, 1)
As ∂Ginter/∂α is positive, the highest payo in this interval is for α = α2,
beause the liquidation rate is dereasing in this interval and the lower is the
liquidation rate the higher is the soial welfare. Moreover, higher α leads to lower
dead-weight loss of ineient liquidation.
In the interval of tough bankrupty law (α > α2), b = 1 and d = 0, and the
government's payo an be written as:
Gtough = p(R +B) + (1− p)αL− I (3.13)
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The highest payo in this interval is learly for α = 1, as the liquidation rate is
the same for all levels of α and the dead-weight loss assoiated with the liquidation
of the rm dereases with higher α. It follows that in the government's hoie of
the optimal bankrupty law we onsider only α = α2 and α = 1.
There are two fores going against eah other. On the one hand, tougher law
(higher α) dereases the eieny loss (αL). On the other hand, the atual loss
is also inuened by the liquidation rate. If the toughness of the bankrupty law
is dereased to reah the interval (α1, α2), the eieny loss is higher than for
α = 1. However, the liquidation rate is lower as we show in Proposition 3.5. The
following proposition disusses the hoie of the optimal bankrupty law.
Proposition 3.6. The government's payo for the level of the bankrupty law
α = α2 is larger than the government's payo for α = 1 if the private benet





We have shown that the government's payo in the intermediate bankrupty
law interval is larger than the government's payo in the interval of the tough
bankrupty law if the osts of liquidation (private benets) are high enough. The
soial surplus depends on the extent of ineieny of liquidation. The level of
ineieny of liquidation is inuened by the level of ollateralization and the
extent of private benets. If the osts of liquidation are high enough (the private
benets are high (B > B1) then there exists an interval, where the government's
payo under the soft bankrupty law is higher than the government's payo under
the tough law. This result omes from the fat that under the soft law there is
an interval where there is less liquidation and the projet is still naned. This
happens if the bankrupty law is relatively soft, so that the reditor does not
always favor liquidation, but the law is still not too soft for the rms to use
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strategi default extensively as they are afraid of liquidation. However, if the soft
law enourages too many strategi defaults, the government's payo maximizing
soial welfare is higher under tough bankrupty law.
We an also see that the level of B1 depends positively on θ. This means
that for a given level of private benet B, the optimal level of the toughness of
the bankrupty law under lower ompetition (higher θ) might be α = 1, while
the optimal law under more intensive ompetition would be α = α2. This might
result in tougher bankrupty law and more liquidations under less ompetitive
environment.
3.5 Empirial evidene
In this setion we are going to disuss the results of our model in the ontext
of empirial researh on the use of bankrupty around the world, and we also
test results of our model using a sample of 32 ountries. Our hypothesis are: 1)
There exists an interval of the toughness of the bankrupty law where tougher
bankrupty law results in a lower number of liquidations; 2) Countries with less
ompetitive redit market experiene higher number of liquidations.
Our results are in line with some empirial observations on the use of bank-
rupty law. Claessens and Klapper (2005) found that ountries with better law
enforement (judiial eieny) have higher rates of liquidation. The toughness of
the bankrupty law seems not to have a signiant inuene in ountries with bad
judiial eieny. However, in ountries with good judiial eieny, the redi-
tor's protetion negatively inuenes the liquidation rates. Djankov et al. (2003)
nd that ountries with very bad eieny of bankrupty proedure do not use
bankrupty at all and prefer out-of-ourt negotiations. Comparing with our theo-
retial results we believe that the toughness of bankrupty law depends not only
on the reditor's rights protetion but also on the law enforement. In our model,
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ountries with good judiial eieny an reah the region of mixed strategies,
where the extent of reditor's right has a negative inuene on the liquidation
rate. However, in ountries with bad ourts, the toughness of the bankrupty law
does not play a role as rms always use strategi default and are not naned in
the framework of bankrupty proedure, i.e. use dierent ways of naning based
on out-of-ourt negotiations.
There is empirial evidene in the law and nane literature that nds a pos-
itive relationship between a degree of reditor's protetion and a development of
redit markets (La Porta et al., 1997). A better reditor's protetion together
with a better judiial eieny might introdue the use of formal bankrupty
proedure, hene inreasing the number of bankrupties. With further inrease
of the toughness of bankrupty law, the liquidation rate dereases as the use of
strategi default dereases. This observation is also supported by empirial re-
searh of Pistor et al. (2000) and Pistor (2000). They nd that in transition
ountries development of redit markets is signiantly inuened by quality of
legal enforement but not the toughness of reditor's protetion.
For our analysis we use the dataset of Claessens and Klapper (2005). They
ollet the total number of ommerial bankrupty lings from government and
private soures around the world in years 1990-1999. In order to ompare the
relative use of bankrupty aross ountries, the number of bankrupty lings is
normalized by the number of rms in the ountry. We use this variable of nor-
malized number of bankrupty llings as our dependent variable apturing the
extent of liquidation in the ountry. The summary statistis are presented in Ta-
ble 3.1. Similar as in Claessens and Klapper (2005) as explanatory variables we
use measures of ountry eonomi performane (lagged GDP per apita in US$
LAGGDP, lagged growth rate of real GDP LAGGROWTH).
7
Further we use a
measure of judiial eieny (RULE OF LAW) as reported by La Porta et al.
(1997) for developed ountries and by Pistor et al. (2000) for transition ountries.
7
World Eonomi Outlook Database http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2005/02/data/
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This variable assesses the eieny of ourts in the ountry on the sale from 0
(least eient) to 10 (most eient). Then we use a measure of reditor's rights
protetion (CREDITOR) as reported in in Djankov et al. (2005). This is a mea-
sure based on the methodology of La Porta et al. (1997) evaluating the quality of
reditor protetion on the sale from 0 (worst protetion) to 4 (best protetion).
In order to apture the eet of ountry legal's origin we inlude dummies for ve
major legal system families as reported by La Porta et al. (1997): Frenh ivil
law, English ommon law, German law, Sandinavian law and legal system of
transition ountries (FRENCH, COMMON, GERMAN, SCANDINAVIAN, and
TRANSITION). As a measure of ompetition on the redit market we use the de-
gree of onentration in the banking industry, alulated as the fration of assets
held by the three largest ommerial banks in eah ountry in eah year in the
period 1990-99 (BANKCONC).
8
The data are set as a panel of ountries. As we do not have the observation of
the liquidation rates for all ountries for all years we have an unbalaned panel.
For estimation we use several tehniques. In the rst seven regression reported
in Table 3.2 and in Table 3.3 in Appendix we use a simple OLS model inluding
the time dummies for eah year. In the rst regression we onrm the results of
Claessens and Klapper (2005). The ountries with higher level of GDP have higher
number of liquidations in the next period. On the other hand and as expeted,
GDP growth rate negatively inuenes the number of liquidations. RULE OF
LAW has a positive eet on the bankrupty lings, reditor's protetion has a
positive eet but it is signiant only when also RULE OF LAW is inluded. In
the next regressions we fous on the eet of the ompetition on the redit market.
Regression (2) shows that the degree of onentration of the banking market
positively inuenes the number of liquidations. The less intensive is the level of
ompetition in the banking market the higher is the number of bankrupty lings.
In regression (3) we onstrut an interation term between the RULE OF LAW
8
The variable is from the Fith's BankSope database reported in Demirgu-Kunt (2004).
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and CREDITOR. The eet of the interation term is negative, suggesting that in
ountries with better judiial eieny, better reditor's protetion leads to lower
use of bankrupties. The bank onentration remains positive and statistially
signiant at 1 per ent signiane level.
In the next regressions ((4) and (5)) we use our onstruted dummy variables
RULE5 and RULE8, where the dummy equals 1 if the RULE OF LAW in the
ountry is larger than 8 and larger than 5, respetively, to divide the ountries
into two groups aording to their ourts eieny. Now we an better interpret
the interation term. In ounties with good judiial eieny, a better reditor's
protetion leads to lower use of bankrupty. On the other hand in ountries with
poor ourts eieny, a tougher bankrupty law (better reditor's protetion)
leads to a higher number of bankrupties. We see that the results are relatively
robust as they do not dier for the RULE5 and RULE8 speiations.
In the next panel of regressions we inlude measures of legal origin. The
Sandinavian and ommon law legal origin as well as transition legal system have a
positive eet on the number of liquidations, whereas the Frenh legal system has a
negative eet on the number of liquidations. However, the oeients for Frenh
and transition ountries are not always statistially signiant. The German legal
origin variable is inluded in the onstant. The eet of onentration in the
banking setor remains signiant for all speiations.
In the last two regressions ((8) and (9)) we use xed eet analysis ontrolling
for time as well as ountry eet inluding the lagged growth variable (LAG-
GROWTH), lagged GDP (LAGGDP), reditor's protetion (CREDITOR) and
bank onentration (BANKCONC). In the seond speiation we also inlude
the measure for the size of the redit market (PRIVATE CREDIT); the variable
measures private redit by deposit money banks to GDP.
9
In both speiations
the eet of bank onentration on the number of liquidations is positive and
statistially signiant at 10 and 1 per ent level respetively.
9
The variable is from the Fith's BankSope database reported in Demirgu-Kunt (2004).
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It is lear that the toughness of the bankrupty law depends on the level of
reditor's protetion (CREDITOR) as well as on the judiial eieny (RULE
OF LAW) in the ountry. We believe that a ertain level of the toughness of
the bankrupty law annot be reahed without a minimal level of the rule of law
in the ountry. In the ontext of our model, only ountries with good judiial
eieny an reah the interval of mixed strategy equilibria. In this interval, a
tougher bankrupty law results in a lower number of liquidation. In ontrast,
in the ountries with a poor quality of ourts, the level of reditor's protetion
leads either to no naning if the reditor's right are not proteted enough or
the ountry may eliminate the role of ourts (eieny of the ourts) in the
bankrupty proedure implementing a bankrupty law with automati trigger
or similar design, leading to a high number of bankrupties. If the ourts are
not working properly and the reditor annot rely on them, the liquidation does
not threaten the debtor. However, a tougher law might allow naning and the
realization of projets that were not naned before. As some of the projets are
not protable, this results in higher liquidation rates ompared to the situation
when no projets are naned.
We argue that as the law enforement improved in developed ountries, they
did not have to rely on very tough bankrupty law assuring the mobilization of
apital for investment and soften the quality suh that the reditors still prefer
renaning of defaulted rms, but suessful rms are threaten by speed ation
of ourts and do not laim strategi default so often, leading to less liquidation.
Only ountries with good judiial eieny an aord the softer bankrupty law.
However, explanation is more intuitive and need to be modelled expliitly, the
onept of interation between the judiial eieny and the reditor's protetion
is a topi for a further researh.
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3.6 Conlusions
We study a simple debtor-reditor model with state veriation problem and red-
itor's impossibility of preommitment to no renegotiation. We found that there
exists a mixed strategy equilibrium interval of the bankrupty law where the liq-
uidation rate is negatively dependent on the toughness of the bankrupty law.
Moreover, there is a level of bankrupty law in the mixed strategy intermediate
bankrupty law suh that the liquidation rate is lower than having a very tough
bankrupty law. We show that less ompetitive redit markets have higher liqui-
dation rate in the interval of mixed strategies. If the liquidation osts are relatively
small then tough bankrupty law is soially optimal. Under high liquidation osts,
softer bankrupty law is preferred. We also nd that the soial welfare is lower in
less ompetitive redit markets due to a larger number of liquidations.
The mixed strategy equilibrium appears due to the option of renegotiation.
As the soial welfare for the level of bankrupty law from the mixed strategy
equilibrium interval might be larger then the soial welfare under tough (whih
atually equals to the soial welfare without renegotiation), renegotiation an
enhane welfare.
Empirial evidene of Claessens and Klapper (2005) supports our ndings
about the relationship between the number of liquidations and the toughness of
the bankrupty law and judiial eieny. On the one hand, tougher bankrupty
law in ountries with good judiial system results in lower number of liquidations.
On the other hand, in ountries with ineetive ourts tougher law leads to higher
number of liquidations. We also provide empirial evidene on the higher number




Proof. The payo if the entrepreneur is given:
πentrepreneur = p(R +B − T ) + (1− p) · 0 (3.14)
The payo if the reditor is given:
πcreditor = pT + (1− p)αL− I (3.15)
The soial welfare is given then:
SW = p(R +B − T + T ) + (1− p)(αL) (3.16)
It is obvious that the bankrupty law α = 1 minimizes the osts of liquidation
(hange of property) and hene maximizes the soial welfare.
Proof Proposition 3.2
Proof. Solving the perfet Bayesian equilibrium, we proeed in three following
steps.
1. In the rst step rm deides whether to default strategially or not. The
deision of a rm about default is:
• No strategi default if R− T +B > (1− b)(R +B) + b · 0
• Strategi default if R− T +B < (1− b)(R +B) + b · 0
2. Then we update the reditor's believe aording to the expression (3.1).
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3. In the next step the bank makes a deision about bankrupty
• Bankrupty delared if π(d)(γR + αL) + (1− π(d))αL > R0
• Bankrupty not delared if π(d)(γR + αL) + (1− π(d))αL < R0
Creditor never uses bankrupty (b = 0)
Now we test whether b = 0 is an equilibrium. Following the three steps desribed
above:
1. Firm laims default (as R +B − T < R +B) ⇒ d = 1
2. Posterior probability π(d = 1) = p
3. Creditor does not liquidate the rm if p(γR+αL)+ (1−p)αL < R0 i.e. if:




If α < α1, there is a pure strategy equilibrium b = 0, d = 1. Outside this
interval b = 0 annot be an equilibrium, beause our assumption would be
not onsistent with the bank's ation.




] there is no pure strategy equilibrium,
only mixed strategy is possible.
Creditor always uses bankrupty (b = 1)
Now we test whether b = 1 is an equilibrium.
1. Firm does not laim default (R +B − T > 0) ⇒ d = 0
2. Posterior probability π(d = 0) = 0
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3. Creditor liquidates the rm if αL > R0 ⇒
Only if α > α2 =
R0
L
our assumption b = 1 is onsistent with the reditor's
ation and we have pure strategy equilibrium b = 1 and d = 0 on the interval
α > R0/L. Outside this interval is the reditor's ation not onsistent with
our guess of equilibrium ⇒ b = 1 annot be an equilibrium.
Mixed strategy equilibrium (0 < b < 1)
Firm has to be indierent between laiming default not laiming default.
R +B − T = (1− b)(R +B) (3.18)
Creditor has to be indierent between laiming bankrupty and not laiming
bankrupty.
π(d)(γR + αL) + (1− π(d))αL = R0 (3.19)
Solving (3.18) and (3.19) for b and d we nd the mixed strategy equilibrium.
d∗ =











Proof. First we onsider the perfet ompetition ase. The partial derivation of
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If we onsider the ase with less intensive ompetition, the only dierene is in the
bankrupty rate b∗, as ∂b
∗
∂α
= 0. Therefore, the seond part of expression (3.20) is
equal to zero and it is obvious that also
∂β
∂α








Proof. The liquidation rate in the mixed-strategy interval depends on the level
of reditor rights protetion Proposition 3.4. We an nd the level of reditor's
protetion αliq suh that the liquidation rate in mixed strategy equilibria is equal
to the liquidation rate in a very tough law, i.e. in the pure strategy region where
the reditor always liquidates the defaulted rm. Then, we hek whether this
αliq is lower or larger than the α2 that determines the mixed strategy region. If
αliq is smaller than α2, it is lear that there exists α suh that the liquidation rate
in mixed strategy region is smaller than the liquidation rate under a tough law.
β(α1,α2) − (1− p) < 0 (3.21)
if
α > αliq =




We an show that




It follows, that the αliq < α2, for θ < 1 . Then, there always exists suh an α,
β < 1− p.
Proof Proposition 3.6
Proof. The struture of the proof is similar to the proof of proposition 3.5. We
ompare the soial welfare under α = 1 and soial welfare for α < R0/L. Gintermediate−
G(α = 1) > 0 if α > αsoc.
αsoc =
(B − L+ (θ − γ)R)R0 − γ((1− θ)B − L)R




γR((1− θ)B − L+R0)
L(B − L+ θR)





Table 3.1: Summary Statistis
Country GDP YEARS LIQ.(%) CONC. CREDITOR RULE
Argentina 7081.04 92-99 0.12 0.36 1 5.35
Australia 19309.32 90-99 2.1 0.63 1 10
Austria 25058.76 90-99 1.33 0.44 3 10
Belgium 23961.26 90-99 2.59 0.75 2 10
Canada 20661.69 90-98 2.96 0.56 1 10
Chile 4261.84 90-99 0.28 2 7.02
Colombia 2157.03 96-99 0.16 0 2.08
Czeh Republi 4615.02 92-96 1.49 0.72 3 8.3
Denmark 30264.4 90-99 1.53 0.71 3 10
Finland 23667.6 90-98 4.14 0.75 1 10
Frane 23330.94 90-99 2.62 0.33 0 8.98
Germany 25855.59 92-98 1.03 0.32 3 9.23
Greee 10310.68 90-94 0.29 0.71 1 6.18
Hong Kong 20967.57 90-98 0.55 4 8.22
Hungary 4118.63 92-96 1.99 0.53 3.75 8.7
Ireland 18113.39 90-99 2.74 0.68 1 7.8
Italy 19945.11 90-96 0.54 0.3 2 8.33
Japan 33651.12 90-99 0.22 0.27 2 8.98
Korea 9080.7 90-98 0.17 0.37 3 5.35
Netherlands 23428.67 90-99 1.3 0.81 2 10
New Zealand 14610.86 93-98 3.67 0.7 4 10
Norway 31566.23 90-98 1.83 0.61 2 10
Peru 1830.52 93-99 0.05 0.64 0 2.5
Poland 3086.95 90-96 0.23 0.57 2.25 8.7
Portugal 9898.75 91-99 0.08 0.46 1 8.68
Russia 1794.24 95-98 0.31 0.43 2.5 3.7
Singapore 19833.44 90-99 3.06 0.85 4 8.57
South Afria 3421.53 90-99 4.62 0.78 4 4.42
Spain 14318.88 90-99 0.02 0.54 1 7.8
Sweden 27737.36 90-99 7.61 0.78 2 10
Switzerland 36740.73 90-98 3.33 0.77 1 10
Thailand 2180.28 90-99 0.12 0.66 4 6.25
Turkey 2912.32 98-99 0.86 0.55 2 5.18
United Kingdom 20134.59 92-98 1.85 0.47 4 8.57
United States 27608.5 90-99 3.65 0.2 1 10
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The dependent variable is the ratio of the number of bankrupties to the number of rms
(LIQ.). LAGGDP is the 1-period lagged logarithm of GDP per apita, LAGGROWTH
is 1-year lagged real GDP growth, RULE OF LAW is a measure in interval from 0 to 10
(La Porta et al. (1997)), CREDITOR is measure of CREDITOR'S PROTECTION index
from 1 to 4 (La Porta et al. (1997)), INTERACTION is the interation term between
CREDITOR and RULE OF LAW, BANKCONC on the banking market measured as a
share of assets of three largest bank on the total sum of assets. RULE5 is the dummy
variable equal to 1, if RULE OF LAW>5, RULE8 is the dummy variable equal to 1,
if RULE OF LAW>8. INTER5 (INTER8) are the interation term between RULE5
(RULE8) and CREDITOR.
Table 3.2: Estimation results : Liquidation rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -2.928** -4.160*** -7.495*** -8.353*** -6.939***
(2.40) (4.37) (6.62) (10.28) (5.89)
Lag GROWTH -3.306** -2.672** -2.384** -2.078** -2.021*
(2.38) (2.42) (2.20) (2.25) (1.86)
Lag GDP 0.355** 0.420*** 0.579*** 0.850*** 0.575***
(2.44) (3.55) (4.41) (9.92) (4.90)
Creditor -0.136 -0.122 1.292*** 1.236*** 0.514***
(1.52) (1.39) (3.73) (9.43) (3.22)
Rule of Law 0.206*** 0.077 0.300***
(2.88) (1.08) (4.59)
Bank Con. 2.506*** 2.997*** 2.569*** 2.939***











Year eet yes yes yes yes yes
Country eet no no no no no
Observations 271 257 257 257 257
R2 0.19 0.27 0.36 0.50 0.34
F statistis: 4.77 8.50 11.91 22.44 13.33
Robust t statistis in parentheses
* signiant at 10%; ** signiant at 5%; *** signiant at 1%
The results of year dummies are not reported
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The dependent variable is the ratio of the number of bankrupties to the number of rms
(LIQ.) LAGGDP is the 1-period lagged logarithm of GDP per apita, LAGGROWTH
is 1-year lagged real GDP growth. RULE OF LAW is a measure in interval from 0 to
10 (La Porta et al. (1997)), CREDITOR is measure of CREDITOR'S PROTECTION
index from 1 to 4 (La Porta et al. (1997)), INTERACTION is the interation term
between CREDITOR and RULE OF LAW, BANKCONC on the banking market mea-
sured as a share of assets of three largest bank on the total sum of assets. FRENCH,
GERMAN, TRANSITION, COMMON, SCANDINAVIAN are dummies indiating legal
origin (La Porta et al. (1997)). Private Credit measures private redits by deposit money
banks in ration to GDP.
Table 3.3: Estimation results : Liquidation rate
(6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant -5.915*** -6.799*** -4.380** -0.956
(4.17) (4.82) (2.14) (0.47)
Lag ROWTH -2.879*** -2.287** -1.355*** -0.615*
(2.87) (2.31) (4.17) (1.82)
Lag GDP 0.689*** 0.708*** 0.529** 0.029
(4.20) (4.31) (2.56) (0.13)
Bank Con. 1.656*** 2.350*** 0.645* 0.925***
(3.78) (5.93) (1.73) (2.58)
















Year eet yes yes yes yes
Country eet no no yes yes
Observations 257 257 257 249
R2 0.44 0.53 0.11 0.18
F statistis: 23.84 25.77
Number of ountries 35 34
Robust t statistis in parentheses
* signiant at 10%; ** signiant at 5%; *** signiant at 1%
The results of year dummies are not reported
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Chapter 4
How Does the Bankrupty Law
Inuene a Lender's Deision on
Information Sharing?
4.1 Introdution
The redit markets are aeted by asymmetri information between lenders and
borrowers. There are two basi views how lenders an redue the problem of
asymmetri information. Aording to the rst view, power given to the reditor
by bankrupty laws matters and an redue the moral hazard problem. If the
reditor an more easily enfore repayment, ask for the ollateral or threaten with
liquidation he is more willing to provide redits. This power theory approah
was studied by Townsend (1979), Aghion et al. (1992), Aghion and Bolton (1992)
and Hart (2000). Aording to the seond view, lenders an fous on the type
of asymmetri information that gives rise to the problem of adverse seletion.
The reditor an solve the problem of information asymmetry by investing in
sreening, monitoring (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Jaee and Russell (1976)),
or obtaining the information about the debtors from other reditors (Jappelli and
90
Pagano, 1993). Djankov et al. (2005) and Jappelli and Pagano (2002) provide
some empirial evidene that the informational and reditor power approahes
might be substitutes.
1
Some ountries may speialize on information institutions,
others on laws giving more power to the reditors.
In this hapter, we fous on the determinants of institutions to share infor-
mation. We observe the emergene of institutions for the information exhange
among lenders around the world, whih are alled private redit bureaus. These
bureaus, working on the priniple of reiproity, distribute information supplied
voluntarily by bureau members (reditors). In reent models on information ex-
hange (Jappelli and Pagano (1993), Gehrig and Stenbaka (2001)) information is
more likely to be shared in less ompetitive banking environments. These models,
however, do not take into aount the eet of reditor rights protetion.
We study how two dierent approahes of informational and power theories
interat with eah other. We ask how a bank's deision to share information is
inuened by a government's deision on the reditor rights protetion and how
this is aeted by dierent degrees of bank ompetition in redit markets. We
present a two period model with moral hazard and adverse seletion, where the
deisions on information sharing and bankrupty law arise endogenously. Consid-
ering the eet of bankrupty law hosen by the government, we nd that there
exists a parameter spae, where information sharing is more likely to take plae
in more ompetitive markets.
The main idea of the model is following. We ompare two senarios of monop-
olisti and ompetitive redit market. The monopolisti reditor an extrat the
whole rent from the rm. However, then the manager does not have any inen-
tives to exert eort. If the bankrupty law protets the reditor rights eetively,
the reditor an easily punish the manager in the ase of failure and this makes
1
Manove et al. (2001) analyze the problem of ollateral versus sreening in the adverse sele-
tion model. The ollateral represents the reditor power theories and sreening is an information
theory approah. They nd that these instruments might be substitutes and to extensive red-
itors right protetion might lead to ineiently low sreening.
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eort heaper to implement. In the ompetitive market, however, the reditors
ompete and drive the prie to the ost of apital. As the prie of the redit is
lower, the rm is left with a higher share of the surplus and therefore the manager
has higher inentives to exert eort. In the ompetitive market, even without the
law, high eort might be an optimal hoie and the government does not have to
enourage the eort by the tough law that also auses liquidation osts. If the
government as a soial maximizer is interested in implementation of eort, it has
more inentives to introdue bankrupty law in ase of monopoly market.
Bankrupty laws might not only redue the moral hazard problem but also an
work as a substitute to information sharing, solving the adverse seletion problem.
As the bankrupty laws allow the bank to liquidate unsuessful rms, low ability
rms do not apply for the redit at the rst plae and leave the redit market.
They know that their rms would be liquidated with ertainty. Banks in a mo-
nopolisti redit market, where tough bankrupty law was implemented then lose
inentives to share information. The banks in a more ompetitive environment,
where the government does not have suh inentives to implement tough reditor
protetion, might be still willing to share information. Then, we might observe
monopoly market without information sharing and ompetitive market where the
banks use information sharing.
We provide also empirial evidene on the determinants of information sharing.
Using a ross ountry database we nd that information sharing is more prevalent
in ountries with more intensive ompetition in the redit market. We also nd
that private information sharing is less used in ountries with Frenh and ountries
with former soialisti legal system. However, we do not nd evidene for a
substitution eet between information sharing and the reditor rights protetion.
The hapter proeeds as follows. Setion 4.2 presents a review of the existing
literature on information sharing and reditor rights protetion. In Setion 4.3 we
introdue the model and disuss two senarios of bank ompetition. The hoie of
the optimal bankrupty law and bank's deision to share information are desribed
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in setion 4.4. Setion 4.5 provides empirial evidene and setion 4.6 summarizes
our ndings.
4.2 Literature review
Theory Information sharing about borrowers' harateristis an have impor-
tant eets on the redit market. Jappelli and Pagano (2000) provide an overview
of theoretial studies and emphasize several important eets of information shar-
ing. First, information sharing improves the banks' knowledge about redit appli-
ants and might help to solve the adverse seletion problem in the redit market.
This eet is studied in a pure adverse seletion model by Jappelli and Pagano
(1993). If banks exhange information about their borrowers, they an then iden-
tify reditworthiness of redit appliants that have moved into the banks' market
areas. Given the better information, the banks an lend to these new lients as
safely as they lend to their long-standing lients and the default rate dereases.
Jappelli and Pagano (1993) nd in that setting that bank ompetition has a neg-
ative eet on the lenders inentives to establish a redit bureau. Bank ompeti-
tion disourages from information sharing as the bank that provides information
about its lients to its ompetitors enable these ompetitors to ompete more
aggressively. If there are signiant barriers that limit ompetition, banks are
not threatened by intensive ompetition if they provide information and they are
more likely to share.
Two other important eets of information sharing are studied by Padilla
and Pagano (1997) and Padilla and Pagano (2000). They stress the information
sharing eet on manager's inentives. Padilla and Pagano (1997) argue that
the information advantage that banks obtain from long-relationships with rms
produes a hold-up problem: borrowers antiipate that the banks will extrat the
whole surplus in future and they exert low eort to perform. By information
sharing banks an ommit to redue their information rents and leave a larger
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portion of the surplus generated by the projet to the entrepreneur giving him
more inentives to exert eort. Padilla and Pagano (2000) fous on the disiplinary
eet of information sharing. Information about defaults shared by banks is a bad
signal about the rm's quality. Firms are trying to avoid the default by exerting
more eort beause this signal is assoiated with higher interest rates.
In the reent literature we nd studies that take into aount bank ompetition
before the banks aquire the information advantage and nd that information
sharing an be onsidered as a ollusive devie of banks. Boukaert and Degryse
(2004) study a duopoly banking market and nd that the bank has an inentive to
dislose some information about its lients in order to inuene the rival's entry.
2
Gehrig and Stenbaka (2001) analyze a model with repeated bank ompetition
and swithing osts. The banks enhane their prots using information sharing
to relax ompetition in the rst period.
3
Empirial studies There is a growing empirial literature on information shar-
ing. Jappelli and Pagano (2002) study how information sharing inuenes lending
and the number of defaults. They nd that information sharing is assoiated with
higher bank lending and lower redit risk. Djankov et al. (2005) study the de-
terminants of the size of redit markets in 129 ountries. They nd that the
existene of information sharing institutions is related to higher ratios of private
redit to GDP. They also nd that legal origin is an important determinant of the
emergene of information sharing institutions. Both studies (Jappelli and Pagano
(2002), Djankov et al. (2005)) suggest that information sharing institutions and
reditor protetion rights may be substitutes, i.e. some ountries fous on the in-
2
The inumbent bank, by displaying information about its high ability lients, makes it
unattrative for the entrant to serve other high ability borrowers as these are pooled with a
large portion of bad borrowers. This redues the extent of rival's entry.
3
Without information sharing, banks ompete intensively in rst periods of ompetition to
expand their redit portfolio to be able to extrat the information rent in the next period.
However, information sharing relaxes the ompetition in the rst period and this enhanes
prots of banks. Therefore, information sharing an be onsider as a ollusive devie banks use
to inrease their prots.
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formation hannel others rather rely on power theories and give substantial rights
to reditors. Aording to Djankov et al. (2005), the existene of private registries
is more prevalent in rih ountries as well as in ountries with ommon law and
Sandinavian legal origin.
Bankrupty laws Creditor protetion rights are usually expressed in the form
of bankrupty laws. The bankrupty law an be soft or tough on the debtor.
The tough bankrupty law means that reditor rights are well proteted and the
reditor an easily take possession of the rm's assets and liquidate the rm. The
soft bankrupty law protets more the rights of the debtor and for the reditor it
is more diult to aess the ollateral. The reditor is disouraged by the soft
bankrupty law from starting a liquidation proedure and various kinds of out-
of-ourt negotiations are more likely to be used (reorganization, debt renaning
et.).
4
There exist also many studies analyzing the inentives reated by the tough
bankrupty law on the deisions made by debtor and reditor. Our model of bank-
rupty law is based on Biais and Mariotti (2003). They analyze how bankrupty
laws inuene manager's inentives to exert eort in a general equilibrium model
and nd that a soft bankrupty law is favored by relatively rih agents, who are
not threatened by redit rationing.
Hainz (2004) nds in her model of redit markets and quality of institutions
(bankrupty laws) that the bank's deision to liquidated bad rms has two eet.
First, the bank reeives a payo in ase of liquidation. Seond, liquidating the
unsuessful rm reveals the information about the borrower's type and the bank
loses rent from inumbent ustomers due to the informational advantage. She
4
An example of the soft bankrupty is a law that gives a lot disretion power to the judge and
the judge, onsidering the soial osts of liquidation, is then more likely to rejet the bankrupty
proedure. In ontrast, an example of the tough bankrupty law is automati trigger provision.
An automati trigger provision does not allow for any disretion of the judge and automatially
starts the liquidation proedure if the rm is insolvent. It was implemented for example in
Hungary 1991-1992 (Janda, 2004).
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shows that institutions must improve signiantly to obtain the optimal number
of liquidations.
Many studies have shown the importane of the reditor rights protetion for
the development of redit markets (e.g. Djankov et al. (2005), La Porta et al.
(1997)). However, the quality of reditor protetion does not depend only on
the law itself but also on its enforement. Pistor et al. (2000) and Pistor (2000)
nd that in transition ountries the judiial eieny is a better preditor for the
redit market size than the quality of reditor protetion.
4.3 Model
Firms
Our model is a two-period model of the redit market. We assume that only one
period ontrats are available as in the rms might migrate among ities in the
seond period (see below). The model is based on the adverse seletion model of
Jappelli and Pagano (1993) and on the moral hazard model of Padilla and Pagano
(1997). We onsider a ountry with N towns, N ≥ 3. Eah town onsists of a
ontinuum of rms uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. All rms have an
investment projet with osts I and dier with respet to their protability. There
are q good (high ability) rms and 1− q bad (low ability) rms. The projet
in the good rm is suessful and earns R with probability ph if the entrepreneur
in the rm exerts eort and earns 0 with probability 1−ph. The eort osts are e.
The probability of suess of a projet in a good rm if the entrepreneur does not
exert eort is pl (ph > pl), the projet fails with probability 1− pl. All projets in
bad rms are unsuessful with ertainty. The eort hosen in the rst period is
not observable and determines the outome of the projet in both periods, i.e. in
the seond period the manager does not exert any eort. The rm does not know
its type in the rst period, it realizes its type in the seond period.
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Banks and information sharing
In eah town there is one bank. Firms do not have any internal funds, they have to
borrow the funds from a bank to over the osts of the projet I. If the projet is
suessful, the entrepreneur is supposed to pay bak the endogenously determined
prie of the redit T 1 and T 2 at the end of the rst and seond period respetively.
The bank, like the rm, does not know the type of the rm in the rst period.
In the seond period, the bank observes ostlessly the type of the rms to whih
it provided a redit in the rst period. In the seond period, eah bank faes
a turnover in its ustomer base as a portion m of the rms in the town moves
exogenously to another town and is replaed by the same portion of immigrants
from other towns. The banks learn the type of their old lients that stay in the
town (residents), however, the migrants from other towns are a blak box, the
bank does not know the type of migrant rms.
The banks an share information about the migrants in the seond period.
Sharing information means that all banks in the ountry agree to set up a redit
bureau. The bureau merges the information provided by all banks into a single
database and all banks get the information about the type of the migrant rms,
whih solves the problem of adverse seletion produed by the asymmetri in-
formation and migration in the seond period.
5
We assume that in the seond
period as the rms realize their type, the bad type rms an apply for multiple
redits in all banks ostlessly. They know they are not going to pay bak the
redit and they just want to enjoy the utility from being in business. This implies
that the adverse seletion problem in the seond period is so severe that a bank
annot serve lients without information on their type. This is a strong assump-
tion, however, it emphasizes the idea of information sharing. On the one hand, in
5
This information sharing design is motivated by the desription of redit bureaus around
the world. A viable information sharing agreement has to take into aount that banks ex-post
have inentives to heat by not reporting or misreporting information about its good ustomers.
The agreement usually prevent suh behavior by private enforement mehanism. Whenever
the bank behaves opportunistially it is punished by exlusion from the redit bureau (Jappelli
and Pagano, 1993), (Padilla and Pagano, 1997).
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ase of information sharing the banks derease their losses aused by naning of
low ability rms but have to fae tougher ompetition and hene lower prots on
the high ability rms. On the other hand, without information sharing the bank
an extrat some rent from the rms by whih the bank posses better information
ompare to the ompetitors but faes larger losses by rms without information.
Bank ompetition
The ompetition in the banking setor is analyzed in two senarios. In setion
4.3.1, we onsider the ase when serving lients in another town is prohibitively
expensive and the loal bank enjoys a monopoly power. Seond, in setion 4.3.2
we fous on a ompetitive environment that is modeled in the following way: We
assume that banks an serve rms in neighboring towns at additional transporta-
tion osts c that reet their lower eieny in ompeting outside their market
area. We assume that migrant rms hanging their loation in the seond period
move to distant towns, so that their former bank annot keep them as ustomers
(osts of extending redit to rms in distant towns are prohibitively high as in
the monopoly ase). There are several regions in the ountry and the bank an
ompete for the lients only within the one region, while the migrants move aross
the region borders. This assumption assures that the migrant's type is unknown
for the loal bank as well as for the potential ompetitor in the region (Jappelli
and Pagano, 1993).
Bankrupty laws
The government takes a deision on bankrupty law that allows the bank to
liquidate an unsuessful rm. If the rm is liquidated the bank beomes the
liquidation value L and the manager loses his private benet B. For simpliity
we assume B = L. Liquidation of a rm produes soial osts of liquidation U .6
6
This an be justied as ost of unemployment benets, disturbed soial environment in the
ity et. More detail motivation an be found in (Tirole, 2001).
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The bankrupty law is modeled in a very simple way. The bankrupty law is
onsidered to be a disrete variable; if α = 1 the bank an liquidate the rm and
gets the liquidation value, if α = 0 the bank annot liquidate the rm.
We assume, in the same way as Padilla and Pagano (1997), that eah individual
investment is run as a limited liability ompany and that the entrepreneur annot
be disqualied after the default from future investments. If the projet fails, the
entrepreneur annot be held liable for the loss and his future investments are free
of harge and he is not disqualied from future new investments.
Timing
The timing of the game is as follows:
Period 0 The government hooses the bankrupty law α.
Period 1 Banks set pries and ompete for lients. The entrepreneur hooses
eort, the eort hosen in the period 1 determines the outome of the projet in
period 1 as well as in period 2 (Padilla and Pagano, 1997). Then the returns are
realized, suessful rms pay bak the redit, while unsuessful do not and they
are liquidated or not.
Period 2 Banks and the entrepreneur himself learn the type of the entrepreneur.
The probability of suess of the projet is determined by the eort exerted already
in period 1. A portion of m rms hanges exogenously loation from one town to
another. Banks an deide whether to share information about the rms. Banks
set pries and ompete for lients. The payos are realized.
We solve the model by bakward indution. We onsider two ases, rst the
monopolisti ase, where the bank is a monopolist in the town and then we on-
sider the ase with ompetition in the redit market.
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4.3.1 Monopoly in the banking market
We study the ase of monopoly in the redit market and we assume that the osts
of serving the ustomers in other towns are prohibitively high. For the deisions
in the banking market we have to onsider the bankrupty law as given as this
was determined in period 0. We analyze in turn the ases of a soft and a tough
bankrupty law.
Soft bankrupty law
The seond period We start our analysis in the seond period in whih the
bankrupty law is taken as given. If the government implements the soft bank-
rupty law in period 0, the bank annot liquidate an unsuessful rm. There is
no moral hazard problem in the seond period as eort has been exerted already
in the rst period, the eort level is taken as given. The banks realize the type of
rms in their portfolio. A portion of m rms hanges loation to distant towns.
The banks in the seond period an deide whether to share information or
not. On the one hand, information sharing brings an advantage in reduing the
problem of adverse seletion. On the other hand, when a bank supplies informa-
tion about its ustomers to a ompetitor, in eet it enourages more aggressive
ompetition. In the ase of monopoly when banks annot ompete for the lients
in the neighboring towns even after information sharing was introdued, there
are no disadvantages of information sharing and monopolisti banks always have
inentives to share information.
The monopolisti bank thus solves the problem of adverse seletion in the
seond period by exhanging the information about all lients. Then the bank
an serve only good type entrepreneurs and harge them monopolisti pries. We
have to onsider two ases in whih low or high eort was exerted, respetively.
The rm has to pay bak the prie of the redit T2; the rm's partiipation
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onstraint in the seond period is:
pi(R +B − T
2
i ) + (1− pi)B ≥ 0, i = h, l (4.1)
The bank as a monopolist makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer and makes the partii-
pation onstraint of the rm binding, extrating the whole surplus of the projet.
This determines the prie of the redit in the seond period for the ase of the
soft bankrupty law
T 2i = R +
B
pi
, i = h, l (4.2)
The rst period In the this period, the moral hazard problem arises. The
monopoly bank has two options. It an either harge the prie that extrats the
whole surplus of the projet. Suh a ontrat does not give inentives to the
entrepreneur to exert any eort. The seond option is that the bank an take into
aount the entrepreneur's inentive ompatibility onstraint and ask for high
eort.
The rm in the rst period is a high ability rm with probability q. With
probability 1− q the rm is a low ability rm and fails in performing the projet
with ertainty. As in the seond period information sharing eliminates the low
ability rms from the redit market, they are naned only in the rst period.
The inentive onstraint of the rm an be then written as:
q[ph(R +B − T
1
h ) + (1− ph)B + ph(R +B − E[T
2
h ]) + (1− ph)B] + (1− q)B − e ≥
q[pl(R +B − T
1
l ) + (1− pl)B + pl(R +B − E[T
2
l ]) + (1− pl)B] + (1− q)B





This means that if the bank wants to make the entrepreneur exert high eort,
the prie of the redit in the rst period annot be larger than T 1h (expression
(4.3)). However, if the low eort ase is also protable, the bank an extrat the
whole surplus from the rm, i.e. it makes the partiipation onstraint for the low
eort binding and harges the prie T 1l (expression (4.4)).
q[pl(R +B − T
1
l ) + (1− pl)B + pl(R +B − E[T
2
l ]) + (1− pl)B] + (1− q)B ≥ 0




To ompare the bank's options of induing the high or low eort we onsider
the bank's prot in both ases.
Proposition 4.1. Under the soft bankrupty law (α = 0) the monopolisti bank
prefers the entrepreneur to exert the high eort if the eort osts are suiently
low; e < eM , where
e > eM =




The bank as a monopolist makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer and an deide, by
hoosing the appropriate ontrat, whih eort level will be exert by the entrepre-
neur. Clearly, the bank prefers the high eort if osts of exerting eort are low or
the reward for the high eort (ph − pl) is high. If the osts of eort are high it is
more protable to extrat the whole surplus of the projet from the rm and let
the entrepreneur exert the low eort.
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Tough bankrupty law
If the government implements the tough bankrupty law in period 0, banks are
allowed to punish unsuessful entrepreneurs by liquidation. The tough bank-
rupty law an work as a substitute to information sharing. In the seond period,
when the rms realize their own types, the bad rms are sure about their failure.
The bad rms would apply for a redit knowing that they are not going to pay
bak the redit and the entrepreneurs just want to enjoy the private benets of
being in oe. However, if the bank an liquidate the unsuessful rm, this is
going to disourage bad type rms from appliation and they leave the redit
market. Therefore, there is no adverse seletion problem in the seond period
under the tough bankrupty law and the monopolisti banks do not need to share
information to keep the bad rms out of the market.
7
In our analysis we proeed in the similar way as in the soft bankrupty law
ase, only the dierene is that the bank an liquidate the rm and beomes the
liquidation value L, while the manager loses private benet B. This happens with
probability 1− pi, i = h, l.
The seond period In the seond period banks realize the type of their lients
and a portion of m rms in their portfolios hanges loation to distant towns.
Due to the tough bankrupty law, the low ability migrant rms leave the market
and the bank will serve only the high ability rms: loal residents and migrants.
The rm's partiipation onstraint is:
pi(R +B − T
2
i ) ≥ 0, i = h, l (4.6)
The bank as a monopolist makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the rm and derives
the prie of the redit from the binding rm's partiipation onstraint. This
7
If we assume just small ost of ǫ to set up the redit bureau to exhange information, banks
will not have any inentives to inur these osts under the tough bankrupty law.
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implies the prie of the redit equals to
T 2i = R +B, i = h, l (4.7)
Similar as in the ase of the soft bankrupty law, the bank extrats the whole
surplus of the projet. There is no moral hazard problem beause the eort was
exerted in the rst period and eort osts are sunk in the seond period.
The rst period The bank has again two options: (i) to extrat the whole
surplus and aept low eort or (ii) to fulll the inentive onstraint of the entre-
preneur and ask for high eort. The inentive onstraint of the rm is:
q[ph(R +B − T
1
h ) + ph(R +B − E[T
2
h ])]− e ≥
q[pl(R +B − T
1
h ) + pl(R +B − E[T
2
l ])]




The bank an harge a higher prie to indue the high eort ompare to the soft
law ase if the expression (4.8) is larger than the expression (4.3)). If the manager
hooses the low eort, the bank an extrat the whole surplus from the rm, i.e.
it makes the partiipation onstraint for the low eort binding:
q[pl(R +B − T
1
h ) + pl(R +B − E[T
2
l ])] = 0 (4.9)
T 1l = R +B (4.10)
Proposition 4.2. Under tough bankrupty law (α = 1) the monopolisti bank
prefers the entrepreneur to exert the high eort if the eort osts are suiently
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low; e < eM , where






The introdution of the bankrupty law allows the bank to punish the entre-
preneur in the bad state of the world and this makes the implementation of high
eort less expensive. Comparing the soft and tough bankrupty law ases it is
easy to show that eM is smaller than eM . This implies that if the osts of eort
are smaller than eM , the high eort is hosen under the soft as well as under the
tough law. If the eort osts lie in the interval [eM , eM ] then the high eort is
exerted only in the ase of the tough bankrupty law. Finally, if e > eM , the eort
osts are too high for the soft as well as the tough bankrupty law and in both
ases the low eort is exerted.
4.3.2 Competition in the banking market
In this senario we allow for ompetition among banks from dierent towns. The
entrant bank from a foreign town faes a ost disadvantage c. The banks ompete
simultaneously announing the prie of the redit maximizing its prot. To break
ties, the rm is assumed to prefer the loal bank if the oered interest rates are
equal.
Seond Period In the seond period, banks realize the type of their lients and
a portion of m rms migrate to distant town. The bank has to deide whether to




Without information sharing the loal and the foreign bank have the same in-
formation about migrants. Due to the problem of adverse seletion that arises
in the seond period, banks annot serve rms without information about their
types. The loal bank an sort out migrants and old residents and an harge
the monopoly prie to the good-type residents and not serve the bad types. The
bank from the other town annot distinguish among migrants and old residents
and therefore annot serve lients in the distant town.
If the bank behaves as a monopolist, it makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the
(1 −m)q good residents and makes the partiipation onstraint of the residents
binding. This implies the prie of the redit being T 2i , i = h, l, depending on the
eort exerted in the rst period.
T 2i = R +
B
pi
, i = h, l
The bank's payo in the seond period is then:
ΠNS = (1−m)(q(pi(R +
B
pi
− I), i = h, l (4.12)
Information sharing
If the banks deide to share information about their lients in the seond period
they beome ompetitors. The potential entrant oers the lowest possible prie
taking into aount the transportation ost c. With information sharing, the
partiipation onstraint of the entrant beomes:
Πe = q(piT
2
i − I − c) ≥ 0, i = h, l
The loal bank an always oer the same prie as the entrant and in the equi-
librium the rm deides to take the redit from the loal bank. The equilibrium
106




, i = h, l (4.13)




− I) = qc, i = h, l (4.14)
Now we ompare the bank's prot in the seond period without information shar-
ing (4.12) with the ase of information sharing (4.14). The bank's deision on
information sharing is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. The banks share information about the type of the rm in the seond
period if the transportation osts are high enough;
c > cmin = (1−m)(piR +B − I), i = h, l
If the osts c are large enough (c > cmin = (1 −m)(piR + B − I)) the bank
prefers information sharing. If c is smaller than cmin it is more protable not
to share. Clearly the higher the number of migrants the lower are the minimal
transportation osts cmin. It follows that the ondition for information sharing
in the ase when the high eort was exerted in the rst period is c > cminH =
(1−m)(phR+B− I). If the ondition holds for the high eort, it is also fullled
for the low eort ase as ph > pl.
If there is perfet ompetition in the redit market (c = 0), banks an hoose
either not to share information, whih allow them to serve only old ustomers
and harge them monopoly pries or to exhange information and serving all
lients. However, in the perfet ompetition environment, banks do not have
any inentives to start information sharing in the seond period. If they share
information, Bertrand prie ompetition drives the prots down to zero. It is
lear that it is always better to serve only old ustomers and to harge them
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monopoly pries. For brevity we onentrate from now on the situation where
c > cmin.
First Period In the rst period all banks have the same information about
rms and the only dierene is the transportation ost disadvantage c. In the





i ]− 2I − c)− (1− q)I − c, i = h, l
Making the partiipation onstraint binding, it follows that the ompetitive prie
the loal bank oers in the rst period is T 1i =
I+c
qpi
, i = h, l.
Competition in the rst period only takes plae if the transportation osts are
not too high, so that the prie oered by the entrant is still aeptable for the
rm. The partiipation onstraint of the rm in the ase when high eort was
exerted is:
Πfirm = q[ph(R +B − T
1
h ) + 2(1− ph)B
+ ph(R +B − E[T
2
h ])] + (1− q)B ≥ 0 (4.15)
Taking into aount the ompetitive pries T 1h and T
2
h , the expression (4.15) is
larger or equal to zero for c ≤ cM ≡
2phqR−e
1+q
+B−I. For c ≤ cM the transportation
osts are not high enough to reate a monopolisti situation and ompetition
among banks takes plae.
8
Given the ompetitive pries in the rst and seond period we determine the
eort the entrepreneur is going to exert in the rst period:
Proposition 4.3. Under the tough bankrupty law (α = 1) and in a perfet
ompetitive market, the entrepreneur exerts the high eort in the rst period if the
8
If the transportation osts c are lower than cM this is enough to enourage ompetition in
the seond period as well as the maximum osts still ensuring ompetition in the seond period
cM2 = phR+B − I are larger than cM .
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Maximum eort osts that still ensure that the manager exerts high eort
in the ompetition environment (eC) is higher than the maximum eort in the
monopoly ase (eM) as
eC − eM =
(ph − pl)q(B + 2plR)
ph
> 0
We onentrate on the ase when e < eC , thus in the ase of ompetition in
the redit market high eort is exerted in the rst period and the government has
no inentives to adopt the tough bankrupty law. In other words, the ompetition
among banks drives the prie of the redit low enough and leaves the entrepreneur
with a larger share of the projet return enouraging the high eort. We fous at
this parameter spae to emphasize the dierene between the monopoly ase and
the ompetition ase with respet to the government's deision on the bankrupty
law. The hoie of the optimal bankrupty law is analyzed in the next setion.
4.4 Optimal bankrupty law
The government hooses the bankrupty law to maximize the soial welfare. The
soial welfare is dened as the sum of payos of all players minus the potential
liquidation osts U . Competition in the banking market inuenes diretly the
pries of the redit, but from the soial point of view it is more important that
ompetition inuenes the eort exerted by the manager. The government is
learly interested in the high eort whih brings a higher soial welfare and would
like to avoid liquidation osts U . In the ase of ompetition in the redit market,
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the government does not have any inentives to implement a tough bankrupty
law if the the ompetition is intensive enough to ensure the high eort.
However, in the ase of a bank monopoly, if the eort osts lie in the interval
[eM , eM ] the government might want to enourage the high eort even though the
tough bankrupty law would ause liquidation osts. The soial planner ompares
soial welfare under the tough law with liquidation osts and high eort (4.17) and
soial welfare under the soft law with low eort without liquidation osts (4.18).
SWtough = q[2ph(R +B)− 2(1− ph)U − 2I]− (1− q)(U + I)− e (4.17)
SWsoft = q(2pl(R +B) + 2(1− pl)B)− 2I) + (1− q)(B − I) (4.18)
Proposition 4.4. The government hooses tough bankrupty law in the ase of
monopoly market if the eort osts lie in the interval [eM , eM ] and the liquidation
osts are small enough:
U < Umax =
2(ph − pl)qR− (1 + q − 2ph)B − e
1 + q − 2ph
Proof. The proposition follows diretly from omparing the government's payos
in the ase of monopoly for the tough and soft bankrupty laws. SWtough is larger
than SWsoft if the liquidation osts are relatively small, i.e. U < Umax.
For eort osts lower than eM the government implements the soft bankrupty
law beause the tough law is not neessary to enourage the high eort and would
only ause soially ineient liquidation. If the eort osts are higher than eM ,
even the tough bankrupty law does not enourage the high eort and again would
only ause liquidation osts. The government might be interested in adopting the
tough bankrupty law to promote the high eort if eort osts lie in the interval
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of [eM , eM ]. However, this is the ase only if the liquidation osts indued by the
tough bankrupty law are more than overweighed by the improvement in eieny
due to the exerted eort.
If the tough bankrupty law is implemented, no information sharing is nees-
sary. For the eort osts in the interval e < eC , the government does not have
any inentives to implement the tough bankrupty law in the ase of ompetition
as the high eort is exerted even under soft bankrupty law. If ompetition is
limited enough (c > cmin) then banks use information sharing in the ase of soft
bankrupty law.
Proposition 4.4 is the entral result of our analysis. We have shown that
there exists a parameter spae, where tougher ompetition is assoiated with
information sharing. This result is driven by the government's deision on the
bankrupty law. Adopting the tough bankrupty law the government might want
to solve the moral hazard problem in the rst period and to enourage high eort
levels in the monopoly banking market. The introdution of the tough bankrupty
law has side eets as it solves the adverse seletion problem. The solution of
the adverse seletion aused that monopolisti banks do not need to exhange
information. In ontrast, in a ompetitive banking market, the government does
not have suh strong inentives to implement a tough bankrupty law. In the
absene of the tough bankrupty law banks have to deal with the problem of
adverse seletion. Banks then have inentives to share information, nevertheless
only in the ase when information sharing does not destroy their prots due to
the inreased ompetition.
The results are summarized in Figure 4.1. In a ompetitive environment,
banks agree to share information only if transportation osts are high enough to
ensure them suient prots (c > cmin). If ompetition beomes more intensive
(c < cmin) the banks lose inentives to share information. This result is onsistent
with Jappelli and Pagano (1993). If the transportation osts are higher than
cM (i.e. degree of ompetition is lower) banks enjoy monopolisti power and the
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government might want to introdue the tough bankrupty law. If the eort osts
lie in the interval [eM , eM ] the tough bankrupty law then leads to an absene of
information sharing in a monopolisti redit market.
Figure 4.1: Information sharing and the bankrupty law
4.5 Empirial evidene
Our theoretial model predits that there exists a parameter spae, where the
tough ompetition in the redit market is assoiated with a higher probability of
information sharing. Other theoretial models suh as Jappelli and Pagano (1993),
Gehrig and Stenbaka (2001) and Boukaert and Degryse (2004) predit that more
intensive ompetition should be assoiated with less information sharing. In this
empirial setion we would like to ompare theoretial preditions with empirial
evidene. We estimate a basi model analyzing the determinants of the existene
of private institutions to exhange information (private bureaus).
4.5.1 Data
In our analysis we ombine several databases. The nal database ontains data
on 104 ountries around the world. The data on private redit bureaus are ol-
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leted from the World Bank Doing Business Database.
9
The variable BUREAU
COVERAGE is dened as a perentage of the adult population that is listed by
the private redit bureau with urrent information on repayment history, unpaid
debts or redit outstanding.
10
If no private bureau operates, the overage value
is zero.
In our analysis we ontrol for the existene of the publi redit registry with
the variable REGISTRY COVERAGE. The variable is also reported in the World
Bank Doing Business Database and measures the share of adult population ov-
ered by the publi redit registry.
11
As a proxy to measure the degree of ompetition on the redit market we use
the variable BANK CONCENTRATION. The bank onentration is alulated as
the sum of assets of three largest banks to total assets of all ommerial banks in
the ountry and is taken from the Fith's BankSope database and are available for
years 1990-2002.
12
The reditor rights index (CREDITOR) is a proxy to measure
the toughness of the bankrupty law. The index is onstruted by La Porta et al.
(1997). The latest results for year 2002 are reported in the study of Djankov
et al. (2005). The index measures the power of seured lenders on sale from
0 (weak protetion) to 4 (strong reditor protetion). To ontrol for the size of
the redit market we use the measure of the share of private redit by deposit
money banks to GDP (PRIVATE CREDIT).
13
Other ontrol variables inlude
9
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ The Doing Business database provides objetive measures
of business regulations and their enforement. The Doing Business indiators are omparable
aross 155 eonomies. They indiate the regulatory osts of business and an be used to analyze
spei regulations that enhane or onstrain investment, produtivity and growth.
10
A private redit bureau is dened as a private rm or nonprot organization that maintains
a database on the reditworthiness of borrowers (persons or businesses) in the nanial sys-
tem and failitates the exhange of redit information among banks and nanial institutions.
Credit investigative bureaus and redit reporting rms that do not diretly failitate information
exhange between nanial institutions are not onsidered.
11
A publi redit registry is dened as a database managed by the publi setor, usually by the
entral bank or the superintendent of banks, that ollets information on the reditworthiness
of borrowers (persons or businesses) in the nanial system and makes it available to nanial
institutions.
12
Reported at the CD-ROM Finanial Struture and Eonomi Growth: A Cross-Country
Comparison of Banks, Markets, and Development (Demirgu-Kunt, 2004).
13
The variable is from the Fith's BankSope database reported in Demirgu-Kunt (2004).
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GDP in purhasing power parity reported in the IMF statistis World Eonomi
Outlook and dummies for the legal system origin aording to La Porta et al.
(1997) reeting 5 basi legal systems: ommon law (Common), Frenh ivil law
(Frenh), German ivil law (German), Sandinavian law (Sandinavian) and legal
system of transition ountries (Transition).
4.5.2 Determinants of information sharing
We estimate a ross setion for 104 ountries. We run a ross setion regression for
explanatory variables in year 2002, however the data for the overage of private
and publi registries are available only from 2004.
14
BureauCoveragei = β0 + β1BankConcentrationi + β2Controlsi + ǫi
The results for OLS estimations are reported in Table 4.1 in Appendix. In the
rst speiation we ontrol only for the level of GDP per apita in the oun-
try measured in purhasing power parity. In other speiations we inlude the
toughness of reditor rights protetion and other variables suh as the overage
of publi redit registry, size of the redit market and the legal origin of ountry's
legal system. The oeient by GDP has an positive sign and is statistially
signiant. The overage of publi redit registry is negatively orrelated with
the overage of private bureau. This suggest that the publi redit registry an
work as a substitute for private bureaus. The higher degree of bank onentration
(less ompetition) is orrelated with a lower overage of private redit bureau.
Inluding the measure of bankrupty laws does not aet the impat of the bank
onentration and oeients are statistially insigniant.
14
We hek that the variane in private and publi bureau overage is rather small. Between
years 2004 and 2005 the average overage of private registry inreased from 21.5% to 24% and
oeient of orrelation is 97.5% and signiant at 1% level. The orrelation of the publi
registry overage between years 2004 and 2005 is 90%. Therefore, we an reasonably assume
that there were no large hanges between years 2002 and 2004.
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Clearly, there exists an endogeneity problem beause of reverse ausality. On
the one hand, bank ompetition inuenes the deision of establishing the redit
bureau. On the other hand the establishing of the redit registry leads to more
intensive ompetition. It is diult to disentangle the ausality diretion. There-
fore, we use the instrumental variable approah. The instrumental variable ap-
proah provides a solution to the problem of endogeniety by using an instrument
for a endogenous explanatory variable.
Our andidate for an instrument is a variable that reports bank overhead osts.
The variable measures aounting value of a bank's overhead osts as a share of its
total assets.
15
The instrument has to satised two ondition: 1) The instrument
is not orrelated with the error term. 2) The instrument is orrelated with the
endogenous variable (Bank Conentration).
The rst assumption of instrumental variable approah annot be tested. The
overhead osts, whih measures the amount of resoures used by an organization
just to maintain existene, might serve as an instrument, beause we an reason-
ably assume that the overhead osts do not inuene the banks deision to set up
the private redit bureau. In fat, the overhead osts might be orrelated with the
bank onentration. In ountries with high bank onentration we observe large
banks that might inur some eonomies of sale and their overhead osts to total
assets might be lower.
To hek the seond assumption we test in the linear projetion of bank on-
entration onto all the exogenous variables and the instrument (bank overhead
osts). We nd the oeient linked to overhead osts is negative and statisti-
ally signiant. It proves the existene of partial orrelation of the instrument
with the endogenous variable and suggests that the overhead osts variable is a
possible instrument.
For the estimation of the instrumental variable we use a two stage least square
15
The variable is from the Fith's BankSope database reported in Demirgu-Kunt (2004).
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estimator, orreting for robust standard errors. The results are presented in Ta-
ble 4.2 in Appendix. We nd that ountries with more intensive bank ompetition
have a larger overage of the private registry. Results show that if we inlude the
measures for reditor protetion the oeient of bank onentration remains neg-
ative and signiant. Creditor protetion has the expeted negative sign, however,
is not statistially signiant. A higher GDP per apita is assoiated with a higher
overage of the private registry. Assessing the legal origin dummies, we nd that
ountries with Frenh legal origin and ountries in transition have signiantly
lower overage of private registry ompare to Sandinavian ountries.
Empirial evidene suggests that a market with a higher degree of the bank
onentration has lower private redit registry overage. Using the instrumental
variable approah we ontrol for the impat of the information sharing on the bank
onentration (banking ompetition). This result is oherent with our theoretial
ndings. Our theoretial model predits also a substitution relationship between
information sharing and reditor protetion. We do not nd a negative relation-
ship between the quality of reditor protetion and the extension of private redit
bureaus. We do not nd a signiant eet of the reditor rights protetion on
the extent of private information sharing. This might be aused by the use of in-
strumental approah, the low number of observations or the fat the the reditor
index is not a good proxy for variables in our theoretial model (measurement
error).
4.6 Conlusions
We present a two period model with moral hazard and adverse seletion where de-
isions on bankrupty law and information sharing are determined endogenously.
In the analysis we take into aount the eet of dierent degrees of ompetition in
the redit market. We nd that there exists a parameter spae, where information
sharing is assoiated with more ompetitive markets. In this interval, the govern-
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ment has inentives to implement a tough bankrupty law to redue the moral
hazard problem in a monopoly banking environment in the rst period. The side-
eet of the bankrupty law solves the adverse seletion problem in the seond
period. In a more ompetitive environment, the government does not have suh
inentives to implement tough bankrupty law. In the seond period, banks have
to solve the adverse seletion problem by information sharing. Empirial evidene
suggests a positive orrelation between the ompetitiveness of redit markets and
an extension of information sharing. However, we do not observe a substitution




Proof. In the rst period, the bank nanes good and bad projets, In the seond
period, however, only good projets are naned, therefore the bank loses on the
bad projets only one ((1− q)I).
ΠbankH = q(phE[T
2
h ] + phT
1




) + ph(R +
B
ph
)− 2I]− (1− q)I (4.19)
ΠbankL = q(plE[T
1
l ] + plT
1
l − 2I)− (1− q)I
= 2plqR +B − (1− q)I (4.20)
To realize whih is the best option, we ompare bank's prot in the ase of high
(4.19) and low eort (4.20). The prot for the high eort is larger if
e > eM ≡
(ph − pl)(2(ph − pl)qR−B)
ph
(4.21)
In this ase the monopoly bank prefers to ask for the low eort and it an extrat
the whole surplus of the projet.
Proof Proposition 4.2





h ] + 2(1− ph)L− 2I)− (1− q)I (4.22)
ΠbankL = q(plT
1
l ) + plE[T
2
l ] + 2(1− pl)L− 2I)− (1− q)I
= 2(pl(R + L)− I) (4.23)
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Taking into aount the (B = L) we nd that the expression (4.23) is larger than
the expression (4.22) if





In this ase a monopoly bank prefers the manager hooses the low eort and it
an extrat the whole surplus of the projet.
Proof Proposition 4.3







ΠFirml = q(pl(R+B− T
1
l + (1− pl)B+ pl(R+B−E[T
2
l ] + (1− pl)B) + (1− q)B
The high eort is exerted if e < eC = 2(ph − pl)qR.
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Estimated using OLS. The dependent variable is Private bureau overage; Log(GDP-
PPP) is logarithm of GDP per apita measured in purhasing power parity, BANK
CONC on the banking market measured as a share of assets of three largest bank on
the total sum of assets, REGISTRY COVERAGE is the variable that measures over-
age of publi redit registry in adult population, PRIVATE CREDIT measures private
redits by deposit money banks in ration to GDP. CREDITOR is measure of reditor
protetion index from 1 to 4 (La Porta et al., 1997), FRENCH, GERMAN, TRAN-
SITION, COMMON, SCANDINAVIAN are dummies indiating legal origin (La Porta
et al., 1997).
Table 4.1: Estimation results : Private bureau overage
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS)
Constant -101.152*** -101.990*** -81.009** -66.755
(24.262) (24.296) (39.032) (44.182)
Bank Con. -19.337 -18.521 -24.924* -24.044*
(15.175) (15.477) (13.412) (13.407)
Log(GDP - PPP) 15.626*** 15.330*** 15.121*** 12.854***
(2.384) (2.469) (2.634) (3.741)














Observations 104 104 104 104
R2 0.36 0.36 0.47 0.48
F statistis: 27.37 19.16 11.24 10.38
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signiant at 10%; ** signiant at 5%; *** signiant at 1%
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Estimated using IV approah. Bank overhead osts as an instrument for bank onen-
tration. The dependent variable is Private bureau overage; Log(GDP-PPP) logarithm
of GDP per apita measured in purhasing power parity, BANKCONC on the bank-
ing market measured as a share of assets of three largest bank on the total sum of
assets, REGISTRY COVERAGE is the variable that measures overage of publi redit
registry in adult population, PRIVATE CREDIT measures private redits by deposit
money banks in ration to GDP. CREDITOR is measure of reditor protetion index
from 1 to 4 (La Porta et al., 1997), FRENCH, GERMAN, TRANSITION, COMMON,
SCANDINAVIAN are dummies indiating legal origin (La Porta et al., 1997).
Table 4.2: Estimation results : Private bureau overage
(IV) (IV) (IV) (IV)
Constant 62.682 61.722 235.770 231.681
(97.116) (96.396) (176.888) (157.589)
Bank Con. -205.531** -204.357** -253.825** -252.148**
(101.069) (99.820) (120.530) (108.399)
Log(GDP - PPP) 10.953** 11.174** 5.350 5.685
(4.679) (4.650) (6.855) (7.292)














Observations 104 104 104 104
F statistis: 13.00 9.22 3.99 3.61
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signiant at 10%; ** signiant at 5%
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